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Writings about the military matters in Japan usually tend to focus a great deal on 
direct relation with World War Two, with substantially less account poured into the 
analyzing of the military institutionalism in Meiji Period. With the wide array of 
socially great processes happening at the same time, the Japanese spur of modernization 
based on a westernized style of bureaucratic state shaped much of the social reality, in a 
process that needed to be implemented on trial and error, revealing intrinsic 
characteristics of the Japanese reality that were not applicable in a simple effort of 
transposition in the process, where even the failure of central government’s 
implementations served well into defining the Japanese character of both its cultural and 
political life.
I will be analyzing this movement of intense and rapid transformation of the 
Japanese state, with the proposal that at the end of the Meiji Era, the military had 
become the most quintessential and successful institution of the Japanese state, with 
success being defined as the accomplishment of its ideological ventures and being able 
to hold captive the power over other institutions amongst the Meiji state, with the rest of 
the state being adjacent to it. Bolstering immense political and social power, changing 
the relations of the common people to the perpetrators of the means of violence and 
opening an entirely new social space, which they were socially and structurally denied 
before. I will be using a secondary and weberian approach of historical sociology, 
understanding institutions and their dynamics in relation to the common population, 
from the end of a feudal state in 1868, represented in the form of the Tokugawa Bakufu, 
to the end of Meiji in 1912, where Japan had consecrated itself into an empire. Despite 
the wave of militarism having been diminished in the period of Taishô, the social basis 
for its rise already were very well implemented some decades prior. 
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Using the imperial institution as ideological cornerstone to hold their legitimacy to 
power – and at the same time congruently not trying to usurp the power of the emperor, 
even in revolt was a very clear characteristic of Japanese modernization venture and 
political discourse. Into drawing the legitimacy from a central figure, an oligarchic 
coalition was able to topple-down the arguably worn-out Tokugawa system and 
supplement it with a government that could be seen as a response to a serious threat by 
foreign imperialism. Yet, at the same time that the Meiji Emperor was always granted 
ultimate power ever since his ascension to the throne, he was never the true governor, 
acting mostly as a symbolic and enabling figure from which power was transferred. 
The ones who had to worry about the details of everyday government and 
organizational lives were the members of the continuing oligarchic coalition that had set 
the emperor into power on the first place, and these men would be the responsible for 
the shaping of Japan, from its political applications to the ideological. 
A combination of factors might be considered when analyzing the Japanese case 
comparatively with other states trying to defend of – or launch themselves in – 
imperialism. By that time, almost the entire American continent was already 
independent, and in the United States case, already being considered an economic 
power and recently politically stabilized nation after the conclusion of its civil war. 
Brazil was also governed by an emperor just like Japan, but the like of strong launch 
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into capitalistic modernization and the lack of pursue of military expansionism, still 
basing most of its economy into agriculture with no serious attempt of changing to a 
more industrialist approach granted that it was only a relevant power on its immediate 
vicinity. The ventures into the 19th century in Africa, were local governments tended to 
be fragmented and lacking in power of resistance would be very successful in the 
following decades. Also, ventures into Asia from ever expanding European empires 
were exactly what had opened the path to Japan in the first place, but the interest was 
bigger on zones with perceived greater economic potential such as India or China, with 
Japan being not the most attractive place for serious imperialistic undertaking. 
In other words, Japan was given time to prepare in case the worst would come to 
fruition, and in the political crisis that followed suit, substituted its government system 
at the same time that it revived an institution from the past again into the realm of real 
political power, where the imperial house was nowhere to be seen in the last six 
centuries or so. It was this sense of urgency that propelled the Early Meiji Japan’s drive 
into modernization, with extreme attention given to political unity, establishment of an 
efficient bureaucratic organization and most importantly of all a strong military, capable 
of defending the land from foreign invasions. This is the starting point of my paper, into 
realizing how much the military necessity had driven the other aspects of the state 
forward on its pursue. After analysis and diplomatic missions made by intellectuals and 
high-sphere statesmen, Japan had launched into the reformulation and modernization 
drive that suited its needs. A strong military needed to be backed up by a strong 
economy, something perpetrated by the motto of fukoku kyôhei (rich nation, strong 
army). This notion needed to be backed by a unified government, that needed the 
collaboration of its citizens not only in the taking of arms (quite literally) or working 
force, but also in the way of thinking for the nationalistic ventures. 
Because of Japan’s character of trying a simple supplementation of western 
institutions somewhat alien to its realities, it was a backwards case where the society 
needed to be shaped by its institutions, and then with the rebounding ideas and 
applications having to be intensely revised in a short period of time, all the while some 
challenges, internal or external made the overall feeling of the Early Meiji years being 
somewhat of a political and social rollercoaster, all the while the later years of Meiji had 
some more focus on solving external issues, and where the country could launch itself 
in two wars and some expeditions of imperialistic character.  
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The very ‘complete’ aspect of the Meiji Period also makes for an easy to 
understand timeframe of study. From the destruction of the old system to the 
establishment of an empire after two major victories in wars, with a political crisis 
marking the right after period of the death of Emperor Meiji, with significant changes 
on the political and organizational grounds  of the state bureaucratic apparatus seems to 
make everything flow easier when separating an approachable window of time.
This aspect of extreme organization of the Japanese institutions and social order 
– despite being mostly exaggerated to western audiences – was always a very 
interesting issue for me ever since I have started studying the Japanese history, and one 
that I’ve carried with me during my years studying history. I also admit being affected 
by the great wave of exposure to Japanese pop-culture or perceptions of Japan in pop-
culture such as movies, books, TV shows and so on, being what initially sparked my 
initial interest in the land of the rising sun. I also do admit having a bias towards 
working with a more historical approach to the theme of Japan and its society because 
of my undergraduate background, however I do strongly believe that the two disciplines 
can have a great dialogue together. Also, the lack of skills in the Japanese language 
admittedly limit my quest for more varied sources, making me dependant on western 
authors to understand better the Japanese academic production. 
I will begin by exploring the historical processes on which the very period of 
Meiji has started.
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Chapter 1: Historical Process on Relations to War: From Boshin 
Sensô to Russo-Japanese
Intro
From the moment the black ships of Perry docked at Japanese bays, the Japanese soils 
would be subjected to incredible change and a historical whirlwind that would define 
things even for current day Japan. 
Yet, the turbulence on which the lands of the rising sun would be submitted to on the 
second half of the 19th century were not magically brought upon solely by foreigners 
and their weird culture and warships. After more than two and a half centuries of 
Bakufu rule, sustained by its complicated inner logic and politics, the system was 
mostly exhausted and prone to be challenged, as it’s usually the case for long standing 
political systems. The foreign threat was merely a kick-off point for the internal 
infighting. But in terms of great historical events, many would agree that the Boshin 
War could be crowned as the ‘birthplace’ of modern Japan. In a certain way, a civil war 
to end the period of ‘old Japan’ could be seen almost as cathartic, considering the 
immense deal of inner infighting that anteceded the Edo era in Japanese history. And to 
understand what was at stake, we first need to remember how Japan was governed at the 
time.
Despite having an emperor, the de facto ruler of Japan was the Shogun, a military and 
political role. From the end of Sengoku (1467-1600) until the very end of Edo, the 
Shogun was a member of the Tokugawa Clan, descending from Tokugawa Iiyeasu, the 
third of the great unifiers of Japan. While the emperor and the royal court lived in Kyoto 
and exerted some symbolic power – since by the Japanese tradition the emperor was a 
direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, the most important deity in the indigenous Shinto 
religion –  the Shogun, its direct retainers and many of the daimiyô’s family members 
lived in Edo. While the shogunate was able to hold on to political power for quite some 
time, it naturally attained its fair share of closeted adversaries who were most likely just 
waiting a perfect moment to strike. The chance arrived with the political turmoil that the 
foreigners brought about. 
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The Foreigners and Internal Turbulence
Japanese relation with westerners had begun as early as 16th century, with the arrival of 
Spanish, Portuguese, British and Dutch vessels to its chores. While traditionally British 
and Dutch were very methodic in their approach (making it mostly as commerce-only), 
Portuguese and Spanish were at the apex of their missionary intents worldwide. They 
wanted not only to establish commercial relations as they wanted to preach Catholicism. 
Initially they were relatively well-received, as at the time of their arrival, Nobunaga 
Oda, the biggest war chieftain at the time was sympathetic to a new religion, mostly 
because of his personal grieves with Buddhism and its monks, and the mission gained 
some momentum, as Christianity is usually very popular amongst masses of the poor. 
After the death of Nobunaga, however, his successors were not so lenient with that 
foreign religion. Both Hideyoshi and Tokugawa were very devoted to traditionalism and 
Buddhism and declared Japan as the land of Kami (gods). The Portuguese and Spanish 
were demanded to cease their missionary efforts once and for all or leave, and in the end 
they chose the second option.  As such, Japan decided to close its ports to foreigners 
and forbid its people from leaving, with notable exceptions being Holland, China and 
Korea. For almost two and a half centuries, the Netherlands would be the only western 
contact in which the Japanese would have, and even so restricted to the island of 
Nagasaki.  With the end of the Shimabara rebellion in 1638, Christianity was banned 
and many measures were taken to prevent it from ever emerging again and to merge 
Buddhism more into the political life of the people, such as forcing every person to be 
registered and affiliated to a Buddhist temple during their lifetime. There was also the 
implementation of a system of reports, encouraging people to tell about Christians or 
Christian activities under heavy penalties not only for the individual who did so, but 
other adjacent families living near that person.
But things were not so simple as to stay that way forever. With the western 
expansionism encroaching to Asia and the need of new consuming markets for the 
expanding capitalism on the 19th century, it was merely a matter of time until they tried 
to return to Japanese lands. Russian scouts were spotted near Tsushima, and the Dutch 
had advised the Shogun about a mission from the west to Japan. The fated day occurred 
in 1853, with the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry aboard the flagship Mississippi. 
The convoys demanded to speak directly to the emperor (apparently not knowing the 
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complex and relatively confusing affairs of inner Japanese politics).  After appalling and 
reorganizing the confusion, the shogun and his envoys were able to deal with them. The 
demand for the sign of a Treaty of Friendship was met by that same year. This treaty 
would establish that the Japanese should offer shelter and supplies for stranded or 
damaged ships. Five years later, the foreigners would return with a commerce treaty in 
hand ready to be signed. Even though the Emperor had ordered the Shogun to not 
accept it – in a rare case in Japanese politics as to call for the emperor’s personal 
involvement with any matter – there was no choice for him, and he ended up accepting 
it. The treaty signed with the US would also have its own versions with Holland, 
England, France and Russia, being unequal to the Japanese, and they would spend a 
good chunk of the following half-century trying to revise them, always deeply resented 
and humiliated. Along with the forced opening of ports for foreigners to commerce and 
to freely live, there was a system of extraterritoriality that granted foreigners to be 
judged by their countries of origin’s law, not Japanese’s, and the most important of all 
being a low import-export ratio on international commerce taxation, making Japan 
unable to raise the tax over external products. This meant the opening to the capitalistic 
system and expanding the diplomatic relations with the foreign nations. 
Of course, this was not met so friendly in the inner works. Much of the ruling samurai 
elite would demand violent responses to banish the foreigners as fast as possible, and 
antagonizing them at all opportunities. According to the British diplomat Ernest Satow, 
a convoy sent to Japan at that time, it was common knowledge amongst the foreigners 
to always avoid the samurai, walk in groups as often as possible and always carry a gun 
with oneself for personal defense, as the swordsmen were fearsome, imposing and had a 
demeaning and aggressive behavior1. This sect would be known as the sect of “Revere 
the Emperor and Expel the Barbarians”, or sonnô joi in japanese. In contrast, the more 
moderate advocates tended to view the opportunity to take as much as possible in terms 
of knowledge and technology to further increase the power of Japan would be known as 
the “Open the Country”(Kaikoku) sect. 
Apparently, the Shogun was not a fool as to launch in a poorly-thought offensive. Even 
if they could expel the foreigners with swift violence, militarily speaking, the counter-
offensive would be devastating. Not so many years before even the mighty Chinese 
1 Satow, Ernest M., A Diplomat in Japan, 1921
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Empire, whom the Japanese historically always saw as a powerful and traditional nation 
was no match for the firearms and steamships of the western invaders. In the end, the 
Shogun had to submit and open the ports, and balance himself in a dangerous and 
complicated political game. Seeing this apparent weakness, many of the rival lords of 
the shogunate would see it as an opportunity to question the power of the Bakufu. 
Despite the ‘Pax Tokugawa’ having worked for two and a half centuries, tensions were 
apparently at an all time high. 
The 1860’s were quite a turbulent decade in Japanese history.  It was a time in which 
many prominent figures took part in a very complicated arrangement of power. There 
were however efforts in unifying the land and submitting the nation under a defined 
central leadership.  
There was an attempt of unifying the Tokugawa and the imperial house by marrying the 
shogun to princess Kazunomiya, sister of Emperor Komei. This plan suffered 
successive setbacks; amongst those was the assassination of the Tairô (a role akin to a 
great minister) Ii Naosuke at the Sakuradamon Gate in Edo in 1860 by radical 
imperialists. This type of assassination was common in Japanese history, and would still 
occur in many important episodes in the following years. In 1861, the marriage finally 
came, but it hadn’t everlasting impact due to the death of the Shogun in 1866.
To make matters worse, the British and French launched punitive expeditions to the 
Japanese shore over some unresolved complaints of foreigners being mistreated or 
assassinated, in 1867. This was a direct display of both the western military power and 
the inability of the Japanese system to sustain itself from foreign influence. The French 
ended up allying themselves to the shogunate, but were forbidden by an overall treaty 
between the western nations to directly help.
The Perfect Storm - The War of the Year of the Dragon 
The death of the Shogun in 1866, while certainly not the cause of the explosion of a war 
on itself, certainly didn’t help. The new Shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, would be met 
with a ticking bomb on his hands and forced to maneuver with very limited options. The 
shift of support of the shogunate by the most powerful domains at the time – Satsuma, 
Chôshû, Tosa and Hizen - would greatly undermine any military and effective power 
the bakufu would still have, and also severely exposing the biggest weakness of the 
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bakumatsu system: military forces relying directly on the feudal lords and personal 
relations of suzerainty amongst the samurai elite, which would be shaky at best and 
catastrophic at worst, as would be the case.
The death of emperor Kômei on January of 1867 signaled an opportunity for the 
loyalists to finally break in armed revolt. This time, not only by one domain as had been 
before with Chôshû, but a coalition consisted of Satsuma, Chôshû, Tosa and Hizen 
secured the young new emperor Mutsuhito (who would later be known as Meiji) in 
Kyoto, where the imperial family resided. 
An attack to the imperial capital from forces of Satsuma and Tosa were repelled by 
Bakufu forces, amongst them Chôshû, in a failed attempt to secure the emperor. 
1867 was indeed a fateful year for the Japanese. Led mainly by the historically 
unsatisfied and isolated from Edo, the domains of Chôshû, Satsuma and Tosa led the 
main force of the rebels against the Bakufu. To say, however, that this was simply it 
would be an oversimplification of the facts. Given the complex landscape of the 
Japanese political system, those domains had a perfect symbol for the legitimacy of 
their war: the emperor himself. It is tricky to say if the imperial figure was merely a 
symbolic pawn or if the leaders of the domain genuinely believed in his divinity and 
authority, but the fact stands that they made the emperor as the cornerstone of their 
army, demanding immediate surrender of the Bakufu and the imperial restoration as the 
head of the Japanese political power. This allowed these domains to attain a strong 
support and to firm itself in a very good legitimate basis for its intents. Refusing to 
surrender, the Bakufu naturally offered military resistance. 
After a complicated battle in the now region of Ueno, the imperialist forces were able to 
secure the place and take over the city of Edo. With the court moving to the city, it was 
now declared as the new capital, and the emperor changed its name to Tokyo. The 
remaining rebel forces moved north, were the fighting would continue until and finally 
ending in 1869 after the fall of the fortress of Hakodate, in Hokkaido.
In February 3rd of 1868, the emperor issued a decree that would reclaim the ownership 
of the power of the land:
“The emperor of Japan announces to the sovereigns of all Foreign countries and to their 
subjects that permission has been granted to the Shogun Tokugawa Yoshinobu to return 
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the governing power in accordance with his own request. We shall henceforward 
exercise supreme authority in all the internal and external affairs of the country. 
Consequently the title of Emperor must be substituted for that of Tycoon, in which the 
treaties have been made. Officers are being appointed by us to the conduct of foreign 
affairs. It is desirable that the representatives of the treaty powers recognize this 
announcement.
[Satow, Diplomat in Japan, p. 324]
On that same day, the Shogun would officially retreat himself from power. This was the 
official end of the Shogunate, but that would not be enough for extremists on the 
Emperor’s side. They demanded that the Shogun would be punished and stripped from 
any of his privileges.
Setting up home – Early Meiji Political Reforms
The post civil war situation in Japan would prove a complicated period of time for the 
country. There was no official arm, the peasants’ lives were still pretty much still the 
same and the old feudal system still remained with exception of who was in charge 
now. There was much work to be done. The overall feeling of the ruling elite it was that 
Japan needed to modernize in order to face itself against the terrible foreigner menace, 
and to establish its sovereignty, much to the molds of the old “open the country” sect 
years before. Old fears and traditions of the elite would also not disappear overnight in 
the faces of adversity. The modernization plan had to be carried throughout the many 
spheres of society, but it would start upwards, from the emperor. He would be the 
symbol of this new age, and with his personally appointed ministers – or men who were 
already really influential in the first place, granting them the conditions to be appointed 
– would dive the country in a strong drive of modernization. 
In 1869 one of the very first acts towards change would happen. The domains of 
Satsuma, Tosa, Chôshû and Hizen would hand their lands to the emperor in a symbolic 
act. In 1871, all other domains would to the same by imperial decree. The division of 
domains had been abolished and they would now be reformed in the Nation – Prefecture 
– City system that is in function until this very day. From 270 domains, there were now 
72 prefectures with governors being appointed directly by the emperor. One of the main 
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objectives was the breaking of the local power in recognition of the central government, 
as it was a historical problem that the central power was always severely undermined in 
a local level, being subject to the wills of the local lords. This very characteristic was 
what led to the Meiji Restoration in the first place, as domains fragmented from the 
central power led a coalition to topple it. 
Government wise, the coalition to control the country was an informally set of advisers 
whom the emperor had surrounded himself with. Even in the future, these advisers 
would retain a considerable amount of power, bouncing between many political roles 
and use their extensive array of personal connections to interfere in the military and 
civilian sphere. They would be called the Genrô.  
To solve the issue of a lack of an army, an Imperial Army was recruited from the 
coalition of Chôshû, Satsuma and Tosa which had restored the emperor to power. 
However, there were doubts as in where their allegiance would ultimately set them: in 
favor of the central government or swearing to old allegiances.  A new army plan was 
proposed, opting to open a conscription and setting up a more numerous and popular 
military force. Naturally, this was met with resistance by more conservative sects of the 
government. After much internal discussion and infighting, so much so that some 
prominent figures who advised for the commoners army such as Ômura Masujiro, 
revered as the father of Modern Japanese Army would be assassinated in 1869 by a 
band of angry samurai in Kyoto. Gradual conscription decrees were issued from 1871, 
but in 1873 an official one was set, called the Chôheirei.
Lives of the People – Social Revolution 
In 1870, an important imperial decree that would significantly change the lives of the 
commoners: the abolishment of the rigid structure of social classes. Before, commoners 
were forbidden of using inadequate clothes or moving to other towns or cities, which 
destroyed pretty much all opportunities of social ascension they may have had. Now, 
they could even dress in western clothing and undertake a wide array of activities before 
denied to them. Of course, mid to high-ranking Samurai would be able to land on their 
feet, but this was a huge blow to the lower classes of Samurai. We’ll cover their 
situation later in this chapter.  The new government wanted to give more opportunities 
to an energetic youth in hopes that able people could serve the function of future 
prominent members of society and impulse Japan into its modernizing and civilization 
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drive. Focus on political participation, relation to the military and the educational 
system will be treated upon in the next chapters.
In general, it is very safe to say that the Meiji state was defined by the following 
characteristics.
 Strong focus on political and social reforms;
 Big preoccupation with the threat of the western powers and the focus on 
military reform and expansion as a countermeasure;
 Swift modernization following the industrial capitalism with a 
paternalistic economic approach of the state instead of a more liberalistic, 
as it was the Prussian case or of other belated unified nations;
 Focus on inducing nationalist and imperialistic values and social 
moralization;
A Council of State was set up at 1871, to be substituted by a tripartite alliance of 
ministers. 
Ending the Samurai Problem
The Samurai class would not go unnoticed and quietly accepted. First, the ending of 
their stipends paid by the government would be a severe blow to the lower class samurai 
everyday lives, and many had to accept any sort of job to sustain. The ending of the 
daimiyô and domain system was another measure that would sink their political 
foundation. In 1876, the last straw would be the banishment of the using of katanas (the 
famed style of samurai swords) and the samurai haircut, the two biggest visual symbols 
of the bushi class. 
The immediate lack of action of the government concerning the Korean question (seikan 
ron) in 1873 did not sit well with some of the government leaders. Because of the 
proposition of Saigo Takamori to invade Korea, the members of the Iwakura Diplomatic 
Mission had to hastily return to Japan before any action could be taken. He firmly 
believed that establishing the control of Korea and force it to submission would be a 
reasonable answer with the dangers that Japan would be suffering in the geopolitical 
scenario. Ôkubo, who was an ally of Saigo and other of the main figures in power, 
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responded cordially to him, going as far as telling him in a letter giving seven main 
reasons why he thought such an act would be foolish and really not a good idea in the 
long run. Amongst the reasons, Ôkubo stated that the fear for a costly war shaking the 
order of the newly founded government, the intervention of foreign powers such as 
Britain or Russia and the shift of focus from internal modernization and political 
strengthening to waging war (details of the letter on next chapter). Feeling as his 
ambitions of power and the treatment the Samurai were receiving from the government 
were undesirable, Saigo decided to renounce and exile himself in his home province of 
Satsuma. As he was one of the most popular of the new leaders and a great symbolic 
figure to the Samurai, also being the leader of the old Satsuma domain, some of the 
other Samurai officers joined him in his leave, such as Itagaki Taisuke, Etô Shinpei and 
Goto Shojiro. These men would follow different paths in their disdained views of the 
central government, but Saigo and Shinpei would be the ones to bear in armed revolt. 
This immediately damaged the new government army and the Imperial Guard, and 
emergency transfers had to be done to cover the losses.
Etô led 2500 men in a revolt in Saga on February of 1874 after a season of poor harvest 
and inflationary food prices. In a swift reaction to the rebels seizing the local 
government offices in Saga, the council of state sent Home Minister Okubo, a civilian, 
as the commander with full military and judicial authority to quell the revolt. This 
would deeply offend Yamagata Aritomo, a firm defender of the superiority of the 
military in relation to civilian affairs. The disarray of the army and the unavailability of 
the Kagoshima garrison, as they were committed to the Taiwan punitive expedition at 
the time, led the government to hire more than 4.000 former samurai from nearby 
locations as reinforcements. After having to flee from Saga Castle and being refused 
help from Saigo, Eto was captured in April and then beheaded after a judgment 
conducted by Okubo. The picture of his head would be used as a warning to anyone 
wanting to revolt, and was held as a triumph of the new military, despite its severe 
drawbacks (Drea, 2009, 37). 
Right after the banishment of swords, uprisings by radical Samurai on southwestern 
Japan exploded in Kumamoto and Hagi, which were suppressed by the local garrisons. 
Luckily for the government, the revolts were tied to local relations and never grouped 
together or spread nationally. The antiquate military tactics and weaponry also helped in 
making the life for the army easier. But the worst was still to come.
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Ever since his disbandment from the central government in 1873, Saigo had secluded 
himself in Satsuma, and started gathering disgruntled samurai who looked upon him for 
leadership and a place to run from the modernization wave that was destroying their 
way of living. Politically speaking, Satsuma was not treated as part of the Japanese 
nation, not paying taxes nor obeying the central laws. The government inability to take 
any sort of crushing initiative and Saigo’s immense personal prestige, even given by the 
emperor himself also relatively shielded him for a while to keep this status quo. By 
early 1876, he had amassed a personal army numbering the 13.000, composed of mainly 
veteran samurai or officers trained in private military academies, had knowledge of 
modern military tactics and possessed a fair share of ammunition, weapons and 
equipment. After the action from students who heard of a plot to assassinate Saigo and 
taking the ammunition supply of the academies – which would force even the ever 
patient Saigo to take a more active initiative to move –  more ex-samurai started 
gathering around him. By early 1877, the year of the great Satsuma Rebellion (or seinan 
sensô, in japanese), his army numbered the 30,000, and in his peak would reach around 
42,000. In the justification for his rebellion, Saigo and his leaders claimed to rebel not 
against the emperor, but against the evil and incompetent officers he had surrounded 
himself, to cleanse the government. The bittersweet taste of historic irony is that less 
than a decade prior, many of the same men would help the emperor to take the power, 
and now they were the rebels (Drea, 2009,  39-45). As it was common in Japanese 
history, it was never the emperor’s fault. 
Saigo’s big plan was to seize the government’s arsenal in Kumamoto, which was 
defended by 3,800 men and two artillery batteries, set in a good defending position. The 
fortress would be able to repel the rebel attacks and withstand a siege, while 
reinforcements from the rest of Japan would fight spread forces of the rebels more to the 
north. The emperor had appointed the field command to Prince Arisugawa (the same 
who had commanded the expeditionary force to Edo in the Boshin War), with 
Yamagata Aritomo in the post of Lt. General as the ground commander and Vice 
Admiral Kawamura Sumiyoshi leading the navy. The government would mobilize 
around 50,000 troops, with 20,000 being garrison troops, 5,000 from the imperial guard 
and employing  13,000 ex-samurai to work assigned to the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, 
and hiring 90,000 contracted civilians to distribute supplies. Waging war in the distant 
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Kyushu would be costly and difficult to handle, but the measure taken was to swiftly 
assemble mixed units and quickly dispatch them to Kyushu. (Drea)
The fighting was bloody and costly. The mountainous and rainy regions in the war also 
played great tactical decisiveness that would shift the focus. However, despite 
difficulties and the fierce fighting spirit of the rebels, the army would be able to 
ascertain victory after victory and denying Saigo and his troops of important victories 
and strategic locations, such as the Kumamoto arsenal. 
Stray and with only a few hundred followers with him, Saigo would commit Seppuku in 
a cave near Shiroyama on the run from the army in August. By the end of September, 
the remaining forces had all been defeated or surrendered. Despite the thousands of 
surrenders, the overall impetus was to fight to the death or commit Seppuku. The end 
result of the war had staggering numbers: around 15,000 casualties for the government, 
with thousands more wounded. On the losing side, around 10,000 dead, 11,000 
wounded and 4,000 surrendered. 
Despite the intense bloodshed, the aftermath ended up being positive on the long-term, 
all things considered. It was the perfect test of the new army, it had finished a politically 
and militarily powerful surviving sect of society and it led to several important 
conclusions regarding the army performance: below satisfactory, in a nutshell. The 
disorganization, unpreparedness and lack of fighting spirit made the army to look 
amateurish and still somewhat inept organization. The very commanders had no overall 
consensus in tactics and strategy themselves. Man to man, the Satsuma fighters were 




The Satsuma Rebellion was the greatest military challenge that the Japanese would face 
in the Early Meiji Years. Until the Second World War, it would be the last war fought 
on Japanese soil. This was essentially a war waged to establish the monopoly of 
violence by the use of the estate on weberian terms2. Now, it was time to return to the 
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modernization drive and to worry on a wider scale once again.
By this time, Japan’s life went apparently smoothly with a few rocky bumps in the road 
internally. Internal protests against the unfair treaties were always a constant source of 
dissatisfaction within the well educated and politically active masses, revolted by the 
unfair treatment to their people, even more with the aspiring dreams of grandeur and 
conquest surrounding the modernizing and militaristic drive of the Japanese nation, in 
no small part thanks to the constant and wise use of imperial and militaristic 
propaganda. Massive industrial expansion and investment in internal infrastructure, 
paired with broader education and a fiscal reform made a tangible change in life for all 
spheres of society. Everyone could now travel in trains, see the rise of newspapers and a 
boom in culture. Urban life had been changed as it never had been before. Accounts 
from foreign newspaper speak of a blooming country with a rich and exotic culture 
enamored to technical wonders of western-style industrialism. Many foreigners would 
set home in Japan, mainly on regions such as Yokohama.  There was however the 
pressing issue of financial crisis for the farmer peasants in some episodes, as a year of 
bad crops could end up catastrophic. It was like this that the government adopted a more 
paternalistic and closed eye approach to the economic models following more those of 
German economist Friedrich List instead of a more liberalistic Adam Smith-esque 
approach3.
The situation on a broader scale was relatively complicated in regards of world 
geopolitics. The old treaties still signed decades before were still not revised, despite the 
Japanese pledges. The USA had finished the Panama Canal and Russia was on its way 
on finishing the Trans-Siberian railway, which seemed to haunt men like Aritomo on 
his dreams. He was convinced that the next target for western imperialism was Asia and 
letting Africa aside. Given the distance and sheer size, Russia was a bigger immediate 
threat. An eventual invasion of Korea – as it was the projection – would signify a 
dagger pointed out to Japan’s heart. It was absolutely vital that Korea remained neutral 
– and by neutral that meant at least under Japan’s influence – in the classic imperialistic 
idea that protecting overseas interests is also protecting the nation.  Given this context, 
2 Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation (1919), translated and edited by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, 
New York, 2015, Palgrave Books, 129-198
3 Gordon, Andrew, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, 2002, Oxford 
University Press
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it feels safe to say that the big focus of all of the military modernizing in the 1880 and 
1890s were mostly dedicated to repel a hypothetical Russian invasion.  
But it was not against Russia that Japan would end up fighting first. In 1894, a peasant’s 
revolt exploded in Korea, putting in jeopardy a so dreamed neutral Korea and 
threatening Japanese interests. The Korean king sent a distress for help to China, who 
answered the call by sending reportedly 5,000 troops to quell the issue, however this 
was a violation of a treaty in 1885 that if China or Japan had to send troops to Korea, 
they should reach an agreement first. Being forced to move quickly under the 
justification of defending the more than 9,000 Japanese living in Korea at the time, 
Japan began its preparations for war against China, with an official declaration on 
August 1st of that same year. 
In this war, the navy would be decisive. The first victory came into being an 
overwhelming success, giving way for the Japanese military to defeat a weakened 
Chinese one. It is important to notice that, despite the situation in China having been 
submitted as a subservient nation to the western powers will, its historical influence and 
reference point for Japan still stood until this war. The small island nation would finally 
be able to fulfill its long lived dream of subduing the mighty (or not so much anymore) 
Chinese empire.  The decisive battle would occur at Port Arthur, a port town guarded by 
a fort. All of the Japanese care in being portrayed as an enlightened and civilized nation 
seemed to have escaped the grasps of its soldiers. On this occasion, the Japanese army is 
accounted for a carnage, the Massacre of Port Arthur, where The New York Times 
newspaper would say that 60.000 people would be brutally murdered, and official 
accounts only accounting for around 2000 (Drea, 2009, 86) . This would be the 
beginning of a streak of violent and explosive episodes of military fury which would 
haunt the Japanese military story until the bloody episodes of World War 2, such as the 
Nanking Massacre.
For the future expansionist plans of the Japanese, this victory could not have been 
better. The propaganda machine made the headlines of the overwhelming victory, with 
special praise to the navy to boost the confidence of the people and instigate a drive for 
conquest. The navy would also finish the conflict with more strength than ever, and the 
relation of rivalry between it and the army would also sink deeper and get set on what 
would come years later as the breaking point on Taisho Crisis. With the recent success, 
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politicians would also feel more motivated to approve the giant budgets in which the 
military – both army and navy – would require on their project of continued expansion. 
By 1903, one third of the national budget was being destined to the military 
(expenditures tables on chapter 2). 
Politically speaking, the consequences would be a mixed bag. Japan would obtain 
Taiwan, but this new domain would prove complicated to take fully into control as 
popular revolts occurred when it was shifted from Japanese to Chinese in 1895, with a 
big revolt sprawling over 50,000 peasants in power, and punitive expeditions to counter 
them would go until 1907. The neutrality of Korea was secured such as the monetary 
compensation from China, aside from exposing the old rival to its apparent decadence. 
This would make China even more prone to being torn apart of its territory by other 
powers, now accompanied by Japan.  Japanese meddling in Korean soil would not stop 
on its venture with China, however, as in October of 1895, without receiving orders or 
consulting with other officers, General Miura Goro ordered the assassination of Queen 
Min of Korea in fears of her actions to expel the Japanese favoring sect from Korean 
government and threatening Japanese interests. This would backfire of course, with a 
popular revolt and General Miura having to return back to Tokyo because of the 
backlash, also endangering the frail situation with Russia over the peninsula and 
instigating an international incident. Furious, the Korean king set the execution for all 
major officials who favored the Japanese and request help from Russia to quell the 
unrest (Drea, 2009,  91-92). In 1898, Japan and Russia would sign a treaty of non-
interference with Korea, but Japan would end up being favored in establishing its 
interests on Korean soil better. It was a problem however on how it would manage the 
question of expansion in focusing in the old Korean plan or now setting Taiwan as the 
head of a new imperial venture?
The new venture of Japan setting its wings abroad would also signify that there was a 
new girl at the ball, ready to dance the complicated geopolitical game that took place on 
southeast Asia at the time. America seized control of the Philippines, Britain still had 
Hong Kong, Russia set its eyes on Korea. As it seemed, it was a possibility to enter in a 
real war with any of those western powers, so taking up initiative and maintaining the 
focus of military modernization was more important than ever. 
22
The boxer rebellions in 1900 would prove a perfect ground of these mixed interests 
within that region: Germans, British, French, Americans, Italians, Russians and 
Japanese, all fighting to suppress the rebellion. Trouble in logistics would stop the 
British from sending more troops, so they asked Japan’s help. The Japanese army gave 
the biggest contribution of troops, around 14,000 men from the total of 33,000 by the 
time they lifted the siege in Peking in August 14 of that year. It was also the perfect 
opportunity for a showcase of newfound Japanese power and discipline, in order for the 
lifting of the unfair treaties that were still an issue to Japanese pride and economy, as 
fluctuations regarding the international commerce would deeply affect Japanese 
economy, plummeting the country into episodes of inflation and greatly prejudicing 
mainly rural peasants (Drea, 2009,  97-100).
War Again: Facing an old fear – time for the truth
Truth be told, Japan had feared for a Russian invasion through most of the second half 
of the 19th century. While Britain and France were still feared and aggressive colonial 
powers and the USA could also have something to gain on the other side of the pacific 
(as they proved with the invasion of the Philippines) Russia was just there, a looming 
ice giant just across the Japanese sea. The finishing of the trans-Siberian railroad would 
open the perfect opportunity for Russia to encroach upon Korea, and within it a direct 
road to attack Japan. The war would eventually happen as a consequence of the 
developments of the Boxer rebellions and the clash of the imperialistic agendas of both 
nations. Being entangled in the Boer War years before and having to balance itself 
against other national interests in Asia, Britain saw in Japan a valuable ally to check the 
Russian advance and to help protect its interests in China. On its part, an alliance with 
Britain would calm some of the Japanese fears of the necessity to go into war against 
them, as well as guaranteeing more security against foreign invasion in the process of 
pursuing its own interests. A sign between the two was signed in 1902, guaranteeing 
both the neutrality against each other’s interests in the region as well as the support in 
case another went to war.
With the end of the Boxer rebellion, there was no more need for some troops to still be 
in Chinese soil, but it was just the perfect justification to settle. Japan and Russia argued 
with each other regarding positioning of troops. Russia wanted to ascertain control of 
Manchuria and Korea. While the Japanese could let go of Manchuria, the latter would 
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not be so easily done. Between 1901 and 1904, when the war finally was declared, 
Japan was already in full time internal preparations for war against the Cold Giant as 
compromise seemed each day harder to obtain by diplomacy. 
Despite the emperor’s personal concerns and reluctance – as it was the case with the 
Sino-Japanese war –, diplomatic relations with Russia were severed in February 6 of 
1904, and in the 8th the Japanese navy would launch a surprise attack (another action 
that would later have an echo in World War II) against the now Russian controlled Port 
Arthur (the same from the Sino-Japanese war) with the intent of making a decisive 
initial victory and opening the way for Japanese troops to move along the Liaodong 
peninsula. The Russian had been complacent into not taking the Japanese threat very 
seriously, so the fort was not entirely defended. In the end, the attack was not ultimately 
successful. Official declaration of war was issued two days later. This failure to gain 
momentum and deny the opponent of a defensive position would have dire 
consequences. 
Despite being called the Russo-Japanese war, one would be wrong to think that actual 
conflict was waged on any of the nation’s soil. This war was fought upon Korean and 
mainly Chinese territory in the Liaodong Peninsula and Mukden as the main Theaters of 
war, aside from the battles on Korean sea. The amount of casualties and expenditure 
was astonishing. The Japanese tendency of packed columns and crazed tendency for 
aggressive assault, added to the use of modern weaponry such as machine guns was the 
perfect receipt for disaster. The final death and wounded tolls in the end would number 
around 70,000 for the Japanese, and around 100,000 to the Russian (tables on chapter 
2). It was a bloodshed as never seen before for Japan, but in the end it resulted in 
victory.
Country morale and confidence couldn’t be better on a superficial way. The powerful 
nation of Japan, symbol of enlightenment and civilization in Asia just had defeated the 
mighty Russian. A new interest in Japan bloomed within the west, attracting external 
investors as well as the alert of danger to the “yellow danger” that was rising on the 
horizon. Winning the war was certainly not a bad thing at all, but heavy criticism befell 
upon the government for the sheer amount of losses along with the heavy financial 
burden that the war had brought. It is important to remember that for the span of 
decades Japan had squeezed the taxing mostly from farmers and industries to the money 
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sink that was the military modernization. Within the military’s upper echelon, 
disappointment was felt as the number of casualties was a reflex of incompetency and 
lack of refined strategy. 
Conclusion 
From turbulent internal violence from setting the Meiji period and later to reaffirm it in 
the early period, Japan’s history was once again paved by violence. Relatively peaceful 
two decades were a good time for the country to undergo massive modernization 
impulse, social reforms, changes in its internal structure and culture and military 
modernization, however with pretty much the same men atop of the power structure yet. 
Japan was also greatly benefitted from timing. As it is always the case with non-factual 
history, it is hard to say what would have been, but a war against a western power on 
the years immediately following Satsuma, or before that, could be catastrophic. By 
taking time upon internal reforms and maturing of its own systems and bureaucracies, 
ranging from education to army, infrastructure to politics, the country could prepare 
itself way better for a better venture into its own imperialistic agendas, despite still 
being greatly worried by those of foreign countries. it was a ripe position to be at the 
end of the Meiji period, being now able to pretty much choose where to invest on the 
next scales. This marked the success of the military institution, as in those pivotal years 
of formation there were very important victories, not only in the sense of guaranteeing a 
positive light on it, but also the guaranteed of cleaning problems in geopolitics. After 
all, nations who lose wars are frequently challenged by others, making matters even 
worse.  As said before, I have not ventured much into the inner situation amongst the 
Japanese situation such as social, economic or political, which I am now about to start 
in following chapters. 
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Chapter 2: State Building as Modern Nation-Japan
The Government right after the Civil War
It is true that in the Meiji Era, Japan would quickly rise to a political maturity on the 
western sense of the expression remarkably fast within the span of less than 25 years. 
The first thing to acknowledge is that, officially, the Meiji Emperor always held the 
highest political and military power from the very beginning.  During all of his lifetime 
after ascending to the throne, Mutsuhito was never politically challenged. Even when 
the Satsuma rebellious took in arms, they were clear to note that they were not 
challenging the emperor, but the authorities who were surrounding him4. This gives us 
an early understanding of the imperial institution in a broader sense, being akin to the 
King in the game of Chess. Technically, even when the imperial institution was at its 
weakest in Japanese history, the Emperor himself was almost never directly challenged. 
Politically powerless yes, but never symbolically, at least to the ones holding the power 
in general. The relationship between the emperor and the people will be further explored 
in chapter 5. What is important to note now is how the adjacent pieces of government 
were arranged with the imperial institution in mind.  
Starting from the immediate restoration occurring in 1868, administration was 
conducted by a provisional government, which would be substituted in June by a 
council of State (Dajôkan), proclaimed by a Constitution of 1868. In April of that year, 
the charter oath was proclaimed by the emperor after being sanctioned by his council, 
addressing the people and symbolizing the full taking of political power. The articles 
consisted of:
1. Deliberative councils shall be widely established and all matters decided by 
public discussion.
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the 
administration of affairs of state. 
4 DREA, J. Edward, Japan’s Imperial Army: its rise and fall, 1853-1945, Dealing with the Samurai, 40
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3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall be each 
allowed to pursue his own calling so that there may be no discontent.
4.  Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just 
laws of nature.
5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the 
foundations of imperial rule. 5
These five articles would be used as some of the main weapons of the opposition to the 
government, as many of these articles are vastly open for interpretation in what was 
related to the actual political realm. 
The Dajôkan would rule over the three spheres of power: legislative, executive and 
judicial on a separate matter. However, given the very strong character of the initial 
coalition of power amongst the people who took out the Shogunate, this Satsuma-
Choshu coalition would obtain the higher spheres in power and their main members 
would hold de facto authority way over their official roles, in a somewhat confusing 
system that could be very intersectional. By 1871, this system would be subject to some 
reformation. The Dajôkan would be divided into the Central Board, the Right Board and 
the Left Board. The Left One would be in charge of Legislative functions, but also acted 
on the most part as an advisory board. The Right consisted in heads of department along 
with their deputies, with those departments mirroring ministries in modern states. Those 
were foreign affairs, finance, war, public works, imperial household, education, Shinto, 
Justice and later in 1873 added by Home Affairs. The Central Board would hold the 
ultimate decisions and act as the most important one, headed by the chancellor (Dajô 
daijin) who would be later replaced by ministers of the left and right and a number of 
councilors6. Again, the issue of bureaucratic intersections and authority exceeding 
official charges were very common. 
Of immediate, they managed to almost completely cripple the power structure of bakufu 
times in the years following the establishment of the emperor at the political realm and 
to guarantee a unified power. Advising for ending the threat of local uprisings, leaders 
including Kido Kôin of Choshu and Saigo Takamori of Satsuma took the initiative in 
returning the official control of their lands to the emperor. Led by the example of the 
5 Tsunoda, de Bary, and Keene, Sources of Japanese Tradition Vol 2,2001
6 Mikiso Hane, Modern Japan, a Historical Survey, 1972, Westview Press, 87
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domains of Satsuma, Choshu, Tosa and Hizen, the other daimyo followed suit and by 
1871, all of the domains were officially returned, with their daimyo being paid 
compensation and some even getting accepted as governors of the new prefectural 
systems. This would strangely echo a few years later, after Saigo parted ways with the 
government and Satsuma was not responding to the official authority of the Nation until 
the end of the Satsuma Rebellion. 
Money spins the wheel: capitalism in Early Meiji
Many of the Meiji Era problems can be attributed to economics issues. The Meiji 
Government greatly struggled during a big part of its time with its budgetary problems. 
Many solutions and acknowledgements had to be done and taken care in order to wrap 
these problems up. The leaders knew that solving the budgetary problems of the 
administration should be a top priority, and were clearly engaged in the motto of fukoku 
kyohei: rich nation, strong army. Using the opportunity given by diplomats in observing 
the western powers in diplomatic missions – the Iwakura Mission being the most 
important – Japan has seen that in their process of conquest and establishing an empire, 
they first developed big industries which would eventually help funding the military or 
expand the reach of their conquering hands by starting with trade, Japan absorbed 
clearly the idea that money equals modernized industry and modernized industry is 
converted to military power, at least to an extent.
However, during most of the duration of Meiji, Japan’s throat was strangled because of 
the treaties it signed with the western powers still in 1858. While some aspects of it 
such as extraterritoriality and opening of some ports for free commerce to foreigners 
were a blow to the pride, it was the article containing an unequal import-export balance 
between Japan and those nations that would make it hard for economical ascent, since 
without being able to control taxation on imports, it was harder to defend the internal 
market and dwell itself in protectionism for economical growth. This would impulse the 
Japanese government’s mentality of building a huge economical block strong enough to 
withstand against foreign capitalism even with an uneven balance. This would influence 
directly in the creation and maintaining of the Zaibatsu – giant conglomerate-like 
enterprises with very close ties to the government – and they would keep going strong 
and aiding the more expensive governmental expenditures. These treaties would also 
inflame political unrest and a lot of justification for protests and social discontent7.
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From the get-go the government had a very serious domestic problem in hand regarding 
budget: the stipends to be destined to the samurai that it inherited from the bakufu 
system accounted for a considerable percentage of its budget8.  As stated before, it was a 
situation that needed to be solved as quickly as possible. The leaders were not slow in 
recognizing this, and by 1873 a new tax system was enacted that would serve as the 
very basis of the Japanese new economic system. Now, farmers had the right of the 
lands to themselves, and could do whatever they wanted with it as long as they paid the 
3% of assessed land value on taxes. This also meant that they could buy, sell or plant 
anything they wanted. In reality, given that their know-how tended to be severely 
limited, most of them just stuck with rice, with some venturing with cotton and soy too. 
Farmers could cultivate whatever they wanted. The rice, which by millennia had been 
the basis for Japanese economy, now lost much of its importance.
The ending of the classes system that came in 1871 and the lifting of the prohibition of 
traveling to another lands within Japan meant that an already established merchant class 
could now reach new areas, and others would be motivated to venture into commerce. 
Some, who were already pretty rich by this time had started to aim at the newfound 
interest in industries. The country needed those if it wanted to grow big and powerful 
such as the western powers, so these ventures were greatly incentivized by the 
government to do so. The government itself took on a very paternalistic approach on the 
expansionism of national industries. Seeing foreign capital as the bane of all the evils, it 
was up for these already previously rich merchants, former shizoku and the government 
itself to take the initial expansionism of industry by hand. 
The government took many undertakings in basic infrastructure works. Telegraph lines, 
train lines, mining companies and heavy industry were all approached by the 
government on its initial entrepreneur phase. Despite initial fears of foreign capital, to 
begin this investment, Japan hired an array of foreigners with the intent of training a 
first wave of industrialist specialized worker class, these men being very well paid. 
Most of these undertakings would ultimately result in failure, but it could be argued that 
with the Japanese government taking the risk and paving the way greatly incentivized 
for the long-term success of future private entrepreneurs9.
7 Gordon, Andrew, A Modern History of Japan, Treaty Revision and Domestic Politics,  91
8 Sources in English bibliography usually vary from around 30 to 45% of government stipend. 
Nevertheless, it is a ludicrous amount of money in national economic terms.
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Ending the stipend dedicated to the samurai – who mostly were changed to bonds – was 
another very important step in setting the ground for a deep economical change.  
Finishing off the remaining traditional samurai in the Satsuma Rebellion served well in 
closing the page on their book. The problem is that the war had caused a great strain on 
governmental budget and plummeted hard the country’s economy, which was already 
shaky at best with the new system still on its infancy. The following years would be 
those of inflation and rise in social protests. 
The following years from 1878 to 1881 would see inflation making the life of peasants 
almost unbearable. Many would be forced to abandon their lands because of debts and 
get thrown into poverty. On the other hand, this would contribute for big landowners to 
increase their influence and capital dramatically. 
To fight against the issue of inflation, impoverishment of the estate and a wide array of 
economic problems, the finance minister Matsukata Masayoshi took the role of finance 
minister in 1881. His almost draconian policies to the objective of controlling the 
economic crisis granted him a very strong and firm space amongst the Japanese political 
life until the end of the century, along with being one of the members of the Genrô. 
Amongst his measures, which became known as the Matsutaka economics or Matsutaka 
deflation economics, included such things as controlling the emission of money by a 
single national bank (before that, many banks were allowed to print currency), severe 
austerity and deflation. Very unpopular measures such as the raising the taxes of 
tobacco and sake ended up being terrible for the common farmers, who couldn’t take 
the impact as well as the rich ones. In comparative terms, in 1881 the peasants destined 
16% of the rice crops for the payment of taxes, while they had to use close to 33% in 
188410. 
The Political Parties and the Diet
Industrialist modernization was a two edged-sword. While it is true that the government 
would strive for the investment in infrastructure and overall bettering of the living 
conditions of the populace – at least in urban centers – the dwelling on ideas coming 
from the west would also mean an easy venture into some of the more moralistic 
9 Gordon, Andrew, A Modern History of Japan, Modern Revolution 1868-1905, 72
10  Hane, Mikiso and Perez, G. Louis, Modern Japan: A historical Survey, Economic Development, 99
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troublesome aspects of it. One of those was the dwelling into the political ideas and 
political resistance. 
Following in the feeling of many political and social reconfigurations that would 
happen in the early Meiji, many high profile individuals would launch themselves to the 
political sphere. 
It might be because of the failure of more violent and traditional type of rebelling 
orchestrated by both peasants and former samurai – which were in almost all occasions 
brutally suffocated and subjugated by the central government – but it seemed that many 
were determined to find ways of resistance. While revolts never seemed to have totally 
disappeared, this was often a resource for the desperate or uneducated. The main 
figureheads who would eventually lead the fronts in the political sense were the urban 
scholars, rural landowners and former calmer samurai. The main movement that took 
place at the time was the Jiyû Minken, the movement for people’s rights.  It was the 
newfound ground of politics. One of the main leaders of this period was the historically 
controversial figure of Itagaki Taisuke. Formerly associated with the government, he 
left out over the same issue on Korea which made Saigo and Shinpei to part ways and 
eventually rise in armed revolt. On the account of Taisuke himself, “Saigo fights the 
government with arms; we will fight with minken”. This Tosa leader would fund the 
Risshisha. He would eventually go back to the government after an invitation in 1875, 
only to leave again due to his claims for a constitution falling on deaf or grudging ears. 
Most of the clamor for the new changes in political participation and the call for a 
constitution would be derived from the Charter Oath. Its justification sounded right 
given the first two articles stated for more political participation between the governors 
and its subjects, however it was never stated how exactly would be the case. Asking for 
a specific constitution seemed more like a simple assimilation of a western concept, as 
many scholars at the time were enamored with the civilization vision that they would 
find either by traveling overseas or from a newfound access to western books. And as 
we’ve seen before, the government seemed quite fearful to make the motions spin too 
fast. Even foreign advisers have advised against the quick adoption of institutions and 
their implementations, seeing as centuries old things were hard to be supplanted in 
Europe or America, and now Japan wanted to go forward by jumping instead of 
stepping on a good pace.  
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The Matsukata Economics which ravaged the economic grounds for many farmers 
would also make a considerable hit in the elites, mainly the agrarian ones who had more 
taxes to pay. It was one thing to dismiss disgruntled peasants and suffocate their 
rebellions with an easy show of military power, but suffocating the now politically 
articulating elites who greatly contributed to the national treasure would prove a little 
more complicated, as they had more sophisticated and hard to combat weapons. 
Making good use of a convention with sake brewers – who were some of the most 
affected persons by the Matsutaka Economics – Itagaki launched officially the Jiyûtô, 
also known as the ‘Liberal’ or ‘Freedom’ Political Party. This was one of the main 
political parties during most of the Meiji Era, and was remarkably popular amongst the 
rural elites. 
Another political group who would rise into the frame was Okuma Shigenobu’s Rikken 
Kaishintô, or Constitutional Progressive Party, founded in 1882. Okuma was one of the 
key figures in politics after the assassination of Okubo Toshimichi and the end of the 
original triumvirate of Saigo, Okubo and Kido, was a member of the Genrô. Ever since 
Itagaki was part of the government, there was some talk of implementing a constitution, 
but the issue was being moved at a snail’s pace. Most likely it could be attributed to the 
repetitive interruptions of peasant revolts and more importantly the great samurai 
revolts of Etô Shinpei (1874) and the famed Satsuma Rebellion (1877) with the 
financial crisis that came right after would postpone the already unpleasant issue. 
In 1882, Crown Prince Arisugawa would set the issue for a proposition. Each one of the 
council of the daijôkan should propose a draft of a constitution and to present around at 
the same time. Okuma, who was an enthusiast of the English model of parliament and 
governmental structure, advocated for a way more radical constitution than the others, 
delivering his paper after all of his colleagues. His idea was that of a constitution that 
diminished the power of the Monarch and granted a substantial power to an elected 
assembly. Adding insult to injury, he proposed that the elections and formation of the 
House of Representatives would come to fruition on the beginning of the next year, way 
faster than any of the other propositions. Adding to the fact that the Emperor was absent 
at the time of this proposal, things were turned upside down in hastened meetings where 
the other statesman have barred Okuma. On his position, what Okuma has made was 
pretty much political suicide. Furthermore, allegations that Okuma would get greatly 
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benefitted due to his ties to the Mitsubishi zaibatsu by the government auctions of 
Osaka greatly hurt his image. When the emperor returned, the other Genrô have 
complied him to issue an edit banishing Okuma from government. He would return to 
have a big role in Japanese politics, however.  
Once out of the government, Okuma would be quick to rally his allies who left with 
him, and organized the Rikken Kaishintô (Constitutional Progressive Party) in 1882. 
Seeing as both men – Okuma and Itagaki – had some similarities before launching their 
party movement, it is hard to not draw a parallel between them. Both were once part of 
the government, but either felt dissatisfied or drawn out of its main sphere. These 
disgruntled men would then rely on their best source of influence: their speeches and 
ideologies to amass people to their cause. Contrary to the Jiyutô, the Kaishintô was 
more popular amongst the urban masses. To oppose them, allies of the government also 
gathered around the Teiseitô, or Imperial Party. However, this party was never very well 
fulfilled in terms of political power because of the very oligarchic and closed off nature 
of the great councils of power.  
The political hysteria that would swipe Japan on the first half of the 1880s was 
remarkable, historically speaking. It also helped the self-fulfillment of centered 
territorialism and almost paranoid state, showing first-hand the needs for a more 
repressive system to guarantee a more secure state against political unrest. In a way, the 
clamor of the parties for a constitution would in the end guarantee by the constitution 
that they would suffer heavy persecution and be officially subjects to censorship.  To 
this end, the police would be the government’s arm, which I’ll cover more on chapter 4.
The Constitution and the Diet In Action
On the government’s side, the process of approving the constitution was going as 
planned. Hirobumi Itô was the man tasked to deliver the constitution, and incidentally 
he was the first prime minister of Japan, going to the post in 1885. In his task, he was 
aided by three individuals: Inoue Kowashi, Kaneko Kentarô and Itô Miyoji, all of them 
being part in the second sphere of influence in Meiji Japan, taking roles of important 
offices (Hane, Perez, 1971). He was also accompanied by the German law consultant 
Herman Roesler, who was hired to aid the Meiji Government.  Before being released to 
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the public, it was discussed extensively by what would be called the Privy Council, 
established in 1887 and going through progressive changes and debates.
Alas, the day finally came. Japan would officially have a Constitution. However, some 
care was taken with how it would be presented and how it would change the landscape 
of politics. On February 11th of 1889 the Constitution came down as a present of the 
Emperor. This symbolism was very important, as it validated even more the Imperial 
figure, which would also be guaranteed by the constitution itself. 
The constitution was an interesting document, if analyzing by a very definite 
perspective, given that rights usually given by a constitution were fundamentally in 
ideological opposition with notions of power from an imperial figure. Robert A. 
Scalapino would say that “the Meiji Constitution was essentially an attempt to unite two 
concepts which…were irreconcilable: Imperial absolutism and popular government”11. 
But the weight of the imperial power was a priority to Itô, even more so as to guarantee 
the rights for the people, and it was made clear.”This constitution was drafted to 
strengthen the authority of the ruler and make it weightier.”12 The most impressive 
feature is that this system actually worked without major complications until the rise of 
the Japanese Fascism. Besides being given the office of ultimate commander of the 
armed forces, the emperor also had an immense array of executive powers, such as the 
ability to convoke, close or disband the Diet, to veto any law passed and approved by 
the House of Representatives and the House of Peers, the ability to declare war or make 
peace and to personally appoint ministers. As a stake for keeping the privileged powers 
of the oligarchy – another thing Itô made sure to consider in the Constitution –, many 
government officials such as the cabinet ministers and the military hierarchy responded 
directly to the emperor instead of the Diet. Another article of utmost importance in the 
Japanese political sphere would be article 11, stating:
Article 11: The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy13
This very article would be the legal pillar on which military ministers or politicians with 
military affiliations would use to do political maneuvers demanding for focus on the 
11 Scalapino, Democracy and the Party Movement, 150
12 Irokawa Daikichi, Kindai Kokka no Shuppatsu, 440-441
13 Taken from the Diet National Library’s website. The address is 
HTTPS://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c02.html#s1
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military and claiming that no civilian politician had any saying on matters concerning to 
the military. This would be known as the ‘right of supreme command’.
While the constitution was a more Prussian-based document, the Diet itself was 
composed based on the British system of two houses, one house of Peers and one of 
Representatives. The house of Peers was formed in preparation a few years prior, with 
the Emperor designing nobility titles to a plethora of influent and well connected 
people, as well as members of the imperial family. Those titles were to follow the 
western-style of rankings, such as marquises, counts, barons and so on. 
As for the representatives, the 300 members composing it would be elected via direct 
vote. One thing of note, however, is that voting was limited to males only who paid at 
least 15 yen of taxes yearly, with priests, teachers of religion, active servicemen and the 
insane were denied the right of voting, making the active voting population somewhat 
amongst the 1,15% of the total (Hane, Perez,   159, 176). While this house was not 
particularly powerful and would still try to ascertain itself in the following years into 
this newfound power structure, the most important political power they held was the 
need of approving the yearly budget – together with the House of Peers – of the 
government. Time and time again, the main discussions to be held at the parliament 
revolved against this issue, being the breaking point that would eventually cause the 
Taisho Crisis.
It is also important to note that there was no clear article stating about the choice of the 
prime minister, but its choice was decided on appointments made by a council 
composed of the greater statesmen. 
Politics itself were taking a new shape. Within this system, some new characteristics 
would appear and start shaping up the future of the Japanese political scenario for years 
to come. To begin with, having a sect made of representatives on a national scale 
elected by the people was an important new step in regards to the Japanese people. Even 
though the whole idea of elected representatives already being in function at a local 
level, based on the historical and traditional divisions of min and ken, established in 
1881 as some sort of appeasing measure to quell the more radical demands of 
democratization and more popular participation. The very fact that the House of 
Representatives existed was an indicative of how much more power the commoner man 
would have, and this would be the gateway to many political careers aspirations. 
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Analyzing either by the government ceding or the people actually conquering 
something, it seemed like the Diet was a symbol of a political compromise, and even the 
most troublesome of characters seemed to behave relatively well within the system.  
The first sessions were marked by bickering, infighting and overall confusion. 
Intimidation, either by political means or physically, were rampant problems amongst 
the higher echelon of Japanese political life. 
There is still however one institution to be covered in political definitions. In fact, this 
one would still be at the top of the Japanese political life, losing in power and influence 
only to the emperor.
The Genrô
The particular case of the Japanese system before the Diet – and even after it – evolved 
around a very tight and firmly grasping oligarchy which drew their de facto power from 
their personal ties with the imperial figure despite many of them not having official 
definite roles nor being a firmly defined institution. Many of those men, despite having 
official titles, their function and power was constantly across a wide array of institutions 
and organizations. Another great thing to consider is that, aside from their desire of a 
strongly unified and powerful Japan and most of them coming from the old han of 
Satsuma or Chôshû, many of these men couldn’t be more different in personality. Much 
of the Meiji Political history can be defined as just new spheres trying to access the 
amount of power that these man had, such as the Political parties, peasant movements 
and so on, and their firm resistance on and control of political power as best as they 
could in their own pace, as evidenced by the swift and aggressive reaction they had 
when Okuma, formerly one of them, presented his project of a constitution which 
proposed an election within one year, getting them all off-guard. It is also important to 
note that they constantly disagreed with each other on a personal level, and much of the 
later Meiji Political life in the years of the Diet would be defined by them trying to 
maneuver each other within the limits of the system and without being in an overly open 
aggressive manner. However, despite the concessions of their political power given to 
the new parliament, they would still be pulling the strings on most parts. Mainly so on 
the account of the before mentioned Right of Supreme command when it came to the 
military matters, mainly used by Yamagata Aritomo. It’s easy to understand that just by 
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seeing the list of prime ministers from 1885, when the role was first introduced in Japan 
until the end of Meiji in 1912 regarding those individuals.
The term Genrô was coined in 1892 by a magazine, which recognized the group. 
Initially being a coalition of Satsuma-Chôshû, continuing the relatively same group that 
restored the emperor to power in the Boshin War, and their personal ties with the 
emperor guaranteed immense political prestige. It is hard to explain them in a timeline 
mixed with all other events due to their long duration, and the group itself is relatively 
hard to define in institutional ways. Its nature was very weird and volatile in definite 
ways comparing to modern-day institutions, and explaining them is easier as a group 
than in separate. Internal infighting, plural personalities, and different philosophies on 
approaching the dangers that the Meiji Government could find itself in, regardless if 
domestic or foreign would be the stepping stones of these men’s maneuvers, yet they 
could display a great sense of pragmatism and group conscience14. Every single one of 
the Genrô had an understanding of the quintessential of the samurai ethos, because all of 
them were samurai when they were young, and descendent from families of samurai, 
even ones who came from relatively lower class families. 
The Genrô, at the time the term came to be, consisted of: Itô Hirobumi, Yamagata 
Aritomo, Inoue Kaoru, Katsura Tarô (from Chôshû),Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840-1900), 
Matsukata Masayoshi, Saigo Tsugumuchi and Ôyama Iwao (Satsuma).  Saionji 
Kinmochi was the only exception not from Chôshû or Satsuma, as he was from Kuge 
(Hane, Perez, 1971). We can expand the term to encompass the main leaders ever since 
the Meiji Restoration also including Kido Koin, Ômura Masujiro, Ôkubo Toshimichi, 
Iwakura Tomomi, Ôkuma Shigenobu, Mori Arinori and a few others. However, the 
majority being almost exclusively from Satsuma-Choshu still remains. Looking at the 
individual members, however, reveals us that overall the ones derivative from Choshu 
would have a long lasting success. Pretty much any big political undertaking in the 
Meiji Era can be traced back to these men one way or another. Itô would be the first 
prime minister and idealizer and writer of the constitution of 1889; Iwakura was the 
leader of the diplomatic mission carrying his name and would serve as a very important 
adviser; Arinori would head the educational reform in 1882 and the one who would end 
up being the most successful of them all, Yamagata, would stay at the top of the 
14 Jansen B., Marius, The Making of Modern Japan
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military institution, establishing his personal clique amongst the high hierarchy and 
constantly was able to get his way on the political realm. Here is a table that exemplifies 
the ones who were at the prime of power:
Years Person Great Political Happenings
1868 – 1873 Kido Kôin, Saigo 
Takamori, Iwakura 
Tomomi
Falling out over the Korean 
question
1873 – 1878 Ôkubo Toshimichi Satsuma Rebellion
1978 – 1881 Ôkuma Shigenobu, Itô 
Hirobumi
Years of inflation and rise 
of the Jiyû Minken
1881 – 1885 Itô Hirobumi Formation of the Cabinet 
system 
1885 – 1912 Itô Hirobumi, Yamagata 
Aritomo
Formation of the Diet, 
Sino-Japanese War, treaty 
of Anglo-Japanese alliance, 
Russo-Japanese war
It is important to note that these men were part of a group and had to abide by their 
overall values and ideologies, as we can see from the clear example of Ôkuma, who 
despite having a considerable position, was ostracized by taking a too radical of a step, 
seemingly trying to outplay his colleagues.  
Here is the list of all prime ministers until the end of Meiji:
Prime Minister Period Times as a Prime 
Minister
Itô Hirobumi Dec 1885  - Apr 1888 1
Kuroda Kiyotaka Apr 1888 – Oct 1889 1
Sanjô Sanetomi Oct 1889 – Dec 1889 1
Yamagata Aritomo Dec  1889 – May 1891 1
Matsukata Masayoshi May 1891 – Aug 1892 1
Ito Hirobumi Aug 1892 – Aug 1896 2
Matsukata Masayoshi Sept 1896 – Jan 1898 2
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Itô Hirobumi Jan 1898 – Jun 1898 3
Ôkuma Shigenobu Jun 1898 – Nov 1898 1
Yamagata Aritomo Nov 1898 – Oct 1900 2
Itô Hirobumi Oct 1900 – May 1901 4
Katsura Tarô Jun 1901 – Jan 1906 1
Saionji Kinmochi Jan 1906 – Jul 1908 2
Katsura Tarô Jul 1908 – Aug 1911 2
Saionji Kinmochi Aug 1911 – Dec 1912 3
This illustrates well the fact that, despite the change in the political system, the 
members of the Genrô were still at the top of politics and were efficient in barring the 
entrance of other groups, as we need to consider that the selection of the prime minister 
was given by an inner council instead of some sort of election or appointment by the 
emperor, showcasing that this group had a certain autonomy. The sheer repetition of 
names is also an important factor showcasing their rigidness and hold to both their 
communal ideology and political ethos.   
War, politics, military and colonialism
If the military was the most important institution in Meiji Japan, war itself was also part 
of this idea one. If not war itself in the early Meiji, at least the preoccupation with it, 
which came to be realized in the latter years. The whole aspiration of fukoku kyôhei was 
defined by that, and the whole situation of fearing invasion by western powers was what 
dictated many measures by the government. Ever since the military re-reforms of the 
early 1880s, the main leaders of the army had the preoccupation of modeling an army 
according to the needs of the defense of the nation, with this sense of defense following 
firmly in the imperialistic sense of the word, as in also defending the interests of the 
nation in foreign lands even if there is no direct attack to its own territory. The simple 
philosophy of attacking before getting attacked or preparing to get attacked first would 
be a great sense of worry for Yamagata Aritomo, the man who could be coined as the 
stepfather of the Meiji Military. He was adamant that as soon as the Trans-siberian 
railroad would be complete, Russia would attack Japan15. As stated before, he was the 
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most long-time successful of the Genrô by installing a very firmly grasped clique within 
his influence in the spheres of the army.
 It is important to note that by the geopolitical scenario of the time, the western threat 
loomed greater than ever, but Japan was also already starting to put its grasps within the 
region of Asia on its direct interests, mainly concerning China and Korea. While it is 
true that the government leaders were mostly adamant against a rushed campaign in 
Korea in 1873, this seemed to be more due to concern for political instability and fear of 
rushing too fast for a successful venture than anything, symbolized by Okubo’s letter to 
Saigo on the why he was against that idea so early in that matter when they had so much 
more to worry about16. In this matter, Japan would act on the presuppose of China 
violating an agreement against moving troops to Korea without Japanese consent, 
caused in the first place by a rebellion in Korean lands in which the king asked for 
support. Being completely understandable to the Japanese reasoning, a foreign hostile 
power taking hold of Korea would be at a very dangerous point of advantage, being 
located in less than 200km of distance it would mean someone with a dagger pointing to 
the Japanese heart. The overwhelming Japanese victory couldn’t come at a better time, 
it seems. It boosted the country’s now reformed army’s morale, gave a great deal of 
credit to a newborn and questioned marine, gave very good propaganda grounds of 
imperial aspirations and it allowed the absorption  of a symbolic meaning of defeating a 
long-seen rival whose shadow always inspired Japan in political and traditionalistic 
sense. In fact, it could be argued that this victory was the official beginning of what 
would be the Empire of Japan, crumbling only in the defeat in World War II. Its victory 
upon the millennial empire of China could also be seen as a very important boost for a 
nationalistic ‘spirit of Japan’ and gave great justification to a rising sense of a people 
attaining its long dreamed destiny as forerunners of the world and racial justification for 
the superiority of the Japanese.  Unfortunately for Japan’s newfound confidence, a triple 
intervention by France, Russia and Germany in the immediate days postwar forced 
Japan to return the Liaodong Peninsula territory previously occupied in the war, 
provoking a significant drawback of an early imperialistic impulse of Japan after the 
war. All of this while the treaties of 1858 were still not completely solved, fueling some 
15 Hackett, Roger F., Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan: 1838 -1922, 138; Harada, Nisshin 
Nichi-Ro Sensô,  27.
16 De Bary, Gluck & Tiedemann, Sources of Japanese Tradition, Volume Two: 1600 to 2000; Part Two: 
1868 to 2000, 21-23
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discontent within the Japanese. It also meant very troublesome implications with 
Russia, coupled with the fact that the Trans-Siberian railroad was to be completed in a 
few years, being a looming threat to Japan, considering the Manchurian position. 
However, despite the wet blanket given by the western nations, Japan would still be 
awesomely compensated by China in the Shimonoseki Treaty, one of the more 
humiliating ones in the whole of Chinese history. Besides territorial possessions in the 
form of Taiwan, China paid the impressive amount of approximately 150 million dollars 
at the time. Considering that the war was a swift Japanese victory and this handsome 
payment came into hands, it was a great financial positive balance. Much of this money 
was to be used for further expansionism of the army, now greatly justified in all of its 
fronts. Some numerical figures can be seen bellow
Strength of Japan’s Army, 1896 - 1900







 Source: Kindai sensôshi gaisetsu,  39.
The chance to prove first-handedly to the western nations how much Japan could now 
also be considered a civilized and modernized country would be in its participation on 
the Boxers Rebellions of 1900. With the Japanese troops being the majority, it was the 
chance they needed, which seemed to have worked, at least with Britain. In 1902, Japan 
had signed its probably most important political treaty in the whole of Meiji: the official 
alliance with Britain. The implications of this treaty were enormous. Not only Britain 
would guarantee to not interfere with Japanese ambitions, but they could also keep in 
check France and preventing other powers from interfering in a possible war against 
Russia, which could have catastrophic implications. This now opened the way for Japan 
to fight for its sovereignty within its neighboring lands, mainly within Korea and China. 
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This was the context that launched Japan in the war against Russia. In fact, this war 
happened over the very same issue that launched them in the campaign against China, 
that is, to defend Korea against the interests of a foreign nation. A foreign nation that 
was not Japan, that is. This time however the worry seemed to be doubled. Ever since 
the 1880s Japan has started considering the serious possibility of engaging war against 
Russia, being considered one of the once so feared western powers and being especially 
dangerous given its proximity (Drea, 2009,  75). However, the Japan of the 1880s was 
way different than that of 20 years later.  A newfound confidence in the victory of a 
decade ago, coupled with an almost complete reformulation of its political system and 
the maturing of several of its institutions was a significant step towards achieving a so 
called modernity. Warfare against Russia had many symbolisms in consideration. In a 
way, it was both a beginning test and an ending test. It was a challenge against the 
stigma of being able to defeat a western nation in combat and to make it free of worries 
about having to give way against those powers, and it was also the first test towards a 
more concrete idea of durable empire. The engagement would also depend heavily on 
the navy, as their success would dictate an initial advantage and barring of the Russian 
ships in entering Japanese soil. It is important to note however that despite its name, this 
war was fought mainly on Korean and mainly Chinese soil, marking it as a very clear 
imperial conflict. 
These also opened ways to Japan finally encroach on a classic undertaking of any 
imperialistic dreaming country: the establishment of colonies. It is important to note 
however the nature of Japanese imperialism on this time period. It might be possible to 
characterize the expedition to Taiwan in as early as 1875 as an expression of Japanese 
imperialism, however, it seems as it was of a different nature. Given the specific status 
of the Taiwan Island at the time, that expedition seems like a very specific footnote with 
the political service of both retaliating the death of sailors from Ryukyu, keeping busy 
some of the high level personnel of more militaristic bias to invade Korea. So much so, 
that the field commander of the mission was the younger brother of Saigo Takamori, 
Saigo Tsugumichi. The way Japan approached Korea ever since the post war against 
China was on a paternalistic note and without a full occupation as it would seem, 
considering the Korean government itself gave way in. Japan tried its best to play along 
with Korean politics and to ascertain its dominance in a more discreet and natural way 
amongst the court politics, but it had to resort to strength on an incident in 1895 were 
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General Miura Goro invaded the palace with armed man and slaughtered some 
politicians, palace residents and the infamous queen Min of Korea, who held a 
considerable amount of prestige and political strength. Despite some protest and Japan 
having to take official account, the issue ended on a relatively tame scale given that no 
major event happened in response to it. It was not the best move regarding do 
international politics, as Itô had to guarantee to the western powers that General Goro 
acted without consulting anyone, but he and his conspirers were declared not guilty 
after judgment17. After the Russo-Japanese war, Korea seemed way more facilitated to 
accept a parental subordination to Japan, where the archipelago nation would lead 
Korea into a ‘modernity wave’ on the same length that Japan has underwent. 
Colonization in favor of modernizing not yet fully civilized countries was a classic 
staple of western imperialism, and now Japan was repeating its pattern despite the 
historical irony after fearing for half a century an imperialistic occupation of its own 
lands. It was doing its job well in faring front in international politics. Itô Hirobumi, the 
same man who served four times as prime minister and was the main responsible for the 
Japanese constitution would lead an effort to the Korean modernization in 1907. He 
would never return to Japan, as he was assassinated in 1909 by a Korean nationalist.
While it is true that the death toll in this war was immense – check table bellow for 
numbers for the Japanese side – the victory had a tremendous symbolic impact, not only 
for Russia and Japan, but also for other powers. In the USA, accounts on the “yellow 
danger or yellow peril” about the country in the other side of the Pacific was taken 
seriously. Many investors from the outside, motivated by the discovery of such an 
interesting country in the east felt attracted and Japan received a wave of investments. 
There were also the more immediate conquests in territory, albeit being way less 
impactful than they had thought, coupling to the fact that Russia decided not to pay 
indemnity backed by the US, which would sprung some political protest in the country18
. Japan was now free to ascertain its domains upon Manchuria – albeit not officially 
attaching the territory – and a more firm grasp upon Korea, now joining Taiwan in what 
was the imperial Japan. 
17 Tokihiko Tanaka, “Min PI satsugai jihen” [The Murder of Queen Min], in Wagamatsu Sakai, Ed., Nihon 
Seiji saiban shiroku Meiji – go (DaI ichi hôki shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1969), 217, 221 – 223, 229; 
Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea, 306-307, 310-323; Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The 
Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-1910 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995) 
18 “Japan’s Present Crisis and Her Constitution”, The New York Times. 3 September 1905.
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Number of Japanese Soldiers Killed, Wounded, or Captured during Selected Battles 
of the Russo-Japanese War
Battle Killed Wounded Prisoner Total
Liaoyang 5.557 17.976 236 23.533
Port Arthur 15.390 43.914  – 59.304
Sha ho 4.099 16.398 628 20.497
Kurokodai 1.848 7.241 242 9.316
Mukden 15.683 51.247 1.581 70.028
Total 42.577 136.776 2.687 182.678
 Source: Ôe, Nichi-Ro, table 2-4,  132 – 133
Accounts on the casualties from both sides range from 58.000 – 86.100 to the 
Japanese to 43.300 – 120.000 for the Russians19. Japanese people, who less than 40 
years ago were barred of entering any sort of armed forces, were now dying at the 
dozens of thousands in the span of a generation, imbued with a loyal spirit of 
nationalism and servitude. Even with some protests on the high death toll – being 
greatly attributed to incompetent war management and strategies – this didn’t seem 
to greatly burst the enthusiasm of a successful rising empire and further spread of 
nationalism.   
By the end of the Meiji Era, this is the map of the Japanese Empire.
19 Dumas, S.; Vedel-Petersen, K.O. (1923), Losses of Life Caused By War. Oxford: Clarendon Press.  57-59; 
Matthew White. Mid-Range Wars and Atrocities of the Twentieth Century – Russo-Japanese War, 
Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century.
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Source https://www.timemaps.com/history/east-asia-1914ad/ accessed on 06/05/2019
We can also analyze the immense cost of the war machine upon the national budget, and 
debates sprung from it on the Diet, who had to approve the yearly budget.
Total Military Budget (in Millions of yen) and Individual Army and Navy 
Budgets, Even Years 1894 – 1902
Year Total Budget Army Budget Navy Budget Percent of 
Total
1894 7.812 1.040 1.024 26
1896 16.855 5.323 2.000 43
1898 21.975 5.389 5.382 51
1900 29.274 6.483 5.727 42
1902 28.125 4.660 2.841 27
Source: Tobe, Gyakusetsu no guntai, 137.
Military Budgets and Army–Navy Breakdowns, Selected Years, 1890 – 1914
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1890 82.125 25.688 28.0 15.533 18.9 10.155 12.4
1893 84.584 22.822 29.3 14.721 17.4 8.101 9.6
1896 168.857 73.248 43.4 53.243 31.5 20.006 11.8
1900 292.750 133.113 45.5 74.838 26.6 58.275 19.9
1903 249.596 83.002 33.3 46.885 18.8 36.118 14.5
1907 602.401 198.316 32.9 126.044 20.9 72.272 12.0
1912 593.596 199.611 33.6 104.125 17.5 95.485 16.1
1914 648.420 170.960 26.4 87.700 13.5 83.260 12.8
Source: Tobe, Gyukasetsu,  109 and 137; extraordinary wartime budgets not 
included
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Chapter 3: Nation Building as Nihonjin; Perceiving a Newfound 
Identity
Intro
Change. So feared, so revered, so complicated. All of these things in many effects at the 
same time shaped the post-civil war Japan. No social scientist or historian would deny 
that the formation of this modern Japan – on whatever sense of the word modern should 
mean – was shaped in response to the geopolitical context of foreign threat, but not 
uniquely because of it.
The letter made by the 16 year old Mutsuhito to his people in April 1868 showed that 
despite the emperor having officially taken the political power of the country unto 
himself was still at an unsure and complicated position. It might be argued that this was 
merely because the Boshin War was yet under place and there was no certainty of the 
future, but it is hard to imagine that this feeling would have changed much in the short 
span of 3 or 4 years after this. Winning the war against the Bakufu loyalists – even if the 
shogun himself had abdicated from power – was merely the first step towards the goals 
of those in power. Given how the Meiji Era began and how it ended, it sterns clear that 
the Meiji Restoration was not merely a punctual event but a process spanning decades. 
The following years had tensions still arising, and it would not until the end of the 
Satsuma Rebellion almost a decade later that many of the government leaders could 
finally rest assured of the internal power being truly unchallenged. Internal being the 
keyword here, as now the problems ahead would be seen in the international aspect. 
In the series of immediate actions and preoccupations following the immediate end of 
the shogunate, the government tried to mend the measures as best as it could. It might 
be argued that in the span of those 10 years, Japan changed more than in the last two 
centuries, even considering the Taika reforms of the 17th century into account. The set of 
changes and reforms was wide. Politics, economy, philosophy, etc. and all of those 
depended on one aspect: the following project of nation, even though it didn’t exist yet. 
And sometimes, to see what we should do, it is good to look on the outside.
Understanding the People of Early Meiji Rural Japan
There is an old famous saying attributed to Tokugawa Ieyasu: 
“Commoners should neither be dead or alive.”
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Considering the state of affairs on which the majority of the Japanese population 
seemed to be in Tokugawa times, Japanese governors took this sentence to heart during 
almost three centuries after it being said. 
Most of the Japanese population was rural, despite the country already having a 
booming and impressive urban life if one is to consider big cities such as Kyoto or 
Tokyo even before the arrival of the westerners in 1853. While exact numbers are hard 
to be verified, we can assure that the literacy rate was very low, maybe only reaching a 
few merchants or extremely exceptional individuals aside from members of the bushi 
class. In the case of the farmers, their whole subsistence depended almost exclusively 
on rice crops, which formed the bulk of Japanese economy and diet, the taxes even 
being collected in crops instead of money. There was also an inherent fear from higher 
spheres of society, who could easily take offense demanding respect and being 
supported by a very strong and rigid social order, a fact accentuated because even after 
restoration, it was still the same men who were village leaders, known as shôya, nanushi 
and toshiyori (varying with locality). An anecdote by Fukuzawa Yukichi, a propagator 
of western ideas, discovered in shock that the restoration did not change the ordinary’s 
people’s behavior or thinking20. Hundreds of years in a situation of political marginality 
and rigid social rule enforced by extreme violence would not be so easily undone if 
extreme changes to people’s everyday life would not also come.
This illustrates the feeling that the sweeping wave of modernity and civilization that the 
big cities - mainly Tokyo – were receiving from the western world was still a long way 
to penetrate into rural Japan. According to Mikiso Hane, even by around the 1930s, the 
rural regions suffered heavily from poverty, poor alimentation, logistical issues and 
terrible sanitary and health conditions. Despite some the reforms taking a few years to 
be actually felt, some of the early measures on which the peasants were introduced to 
that would directly affect their lives could be mainly attributed to three big ones, and 
none of them small in any scale: the new taxation system of land, which would directly 
affect them economically; education, which would directly affect them culturally; 
forced conscription, which would change the relation of the commoners with military 
forces and how they would culturally deal with it.  
2020 Hane, Mikiso, Peasants, Rebels, Women and Outcastes: The underside of Modern Japan, Pantheon 
Books, 1982 ,  13-16; 
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Economy was, needless to say, one of the most important aspects of reform in the Meiji 
Government, and the attempts of regulating and shaping it shaped most of the 
involvement with the civilian sphere. The new taxation system of the land was one of 
the high marks of this. However, while it was a very steady and securable source of 
income for the government – by 1879 it was more than 80.5% of the government’s 
revenue, eventually dropping to 42.9% in the two following decades given industrial 
growth (Hane, 1982,  17) – it opened the opportunity for commoners to enrich 
themselves in case the crops were bountiful, as now the inflation and deflation of the 
prices would mean opportunity for them to get the best prospect of it. However, aside 
from a few bountiful years, the peasants luck was not so kind. Productivity in rural 
Japan was not exactly very high, and the farmers’ lives were filled with constant work 
and poor conditions. Accounts from farmers say that their life was just filled with 
minimal rest, constant tiredness and excessive work, whereas many would prefer life in 
factories, which at the time would be known for their poor conditions of living (Hane, 
1982, 31-34). The lack of any sort of refined machinery, cattle or high quality utensils 
for work only made matters worse. This way, commoners were extremely susceptible to 
bad crops and overall inflation, as the country had to import at a higher price than 
importation – thanks in big part due to the treaties of 1858, no wonder the government 
and Japanese in general hated them so much – so as money lenders or bigger farmers 
who could now buy land from poorer ones. Since they were constantly left with little to 
no choice, many of these smaller farmers were tied to these unfair situations. Many 
would end up in misery or would take up arms in revolt, which saw an increase in their 
number on the period of early Meiji. 
Popular Revolt on Early Meiji: episodic happenings or germination of 
political conscience?
The samurai were not the only ones who ended up in revolt. From 1868 to 1872, there 
are records of around 343 incidents involving peasant risings and unrests21. By 1872, a 
great decline had happened, with only 30 recorded on that year, At first glance one 
could even think that this would be the expression of a more politically active 
population, however this would appear simply not to be true, as more than half of these 
revolts were a result of direct disputes within local tenants, hoarding of rice, foreclosure 
21 Aoki Kôji, Meiji nômin sôjô nenjiteki kenkyû (Tokyo: Shinseisha, 1967), 36
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of loans and other sensitive topics on the more direct farmers’ day-to-day life and 
struggles, having little to do with the central government, and they were very similar in 
nature to protests that happened at the end of Tokugawa rule, with appeals for a 
Confucian-based morality of taking care of subjects and relieving them from too-heavy 
taxes if conditions outside of their control such as plagues, floods and disasters would 
heavily affect their productivity 22. If taken into account that the great rise of political 
conscience within Japanese soil came with the germination and propagation of the jiyû 
minken undô later into the 1870s and early 1880s, then this meant little. Despite 
somewhat rare, peasant uprisings also happened in the Bakufu years when their living 
conditions were in such a deteriorating state that aside from death, they had pretty much 
nothing to lose. As seen before, peasant living conditions didn’t magically improve 
upon the decrees of the new political body. In fact, for the immediate years after the 
restoration, their lives changed virtually nothing, as the village leaders and its social 
structure remained largely the same. It is of no wonder that one of the great worries of 
leaders such as Saigo and Ôkubo at this time was to make the emperor’s image well-
known throughout all nation, in a project that was later carried by the imperial tours and 
later by the maturation of the educational system (more on that on chapters 4 and 5).
One thing in common between the implementation of conscription and the early 
educational system was the adverse response to it in many areas, and the reasons were 
similar. Forced change upon the traditional way of life, implementation that would be 
paid using the peasants heavy taxation and taking able men from work – no matter on 
childhood or early adulthood – diminishing the working power of an average farmer’s 
family. Crowds destroyed around two thousand schools, which accounted for almost 
10% of the total (Gordon, 2002,  68). But the most energetic of the revolts in early Meiji 
seemed to be reactions to the newly enacted conscription law, the Chôheirei. Aside 
from the afore mentioned difficulties, the peasants were not exactly thrilled to join the 
military, despite this institution now opening its doors for peasants to take part in the 
monopoly of state violence that they were denied for so long, with accounts specially 
weary about a mistranslation of the term “blood tax” frequently used in the western 
vocabulary on the subject of popular conscription into the army forces, where in the 
Japanese case people started to think that the young men’s blood was to be removed and 
sold overseas, which was the major cause of the Mitaka’s blood tax riots, where 
22 Ed. By Marius Jansen, Cambridge History of Japan Vol 5, 1989, 368-369
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peasants took in arms to protest, destroying recruitment sites, and having the need to be 
quelled by the central government (Hane, 1982,  18-21 and Cambridge 370-373). The 
aspect of later Japanese nationalist-soldier, imbued by the strong Japanese “national 
character” was no more than a mere successful invention occurring in those years of 19th 
century’s Meiji Era (Gordon, 2002,  66-67). 
The Iwakura Mission
For the central leaders to use a base on what they should do in their modernization 
efforts, they sought the answer elsewhere. Adopting the idea of the sect of “open the 
country” to learn with the barbarians, they tried to do pretty much something similar. 
Aside from the entrance and diffusion of books and theories of course, there was a 
massive undertaking in a diplomatic mission. Undoubtedly, the Iwakura Mission was 
one of the most important diplomatic endeavors in the 19th century. Set up in 1871 and 
leaded by Iwakura Tomomi (hence the name), the participants of this important 
endeavor consisted of high level statesmen such as Iwakura himself, Itô Hirobumi, 
Ôkubo Toshimichi and Kido Takayoshi, and some 60 students, who would stay 
overseas for reasons of study23. They were imbued with a very important mission given 
by the emperor himself on which the whole government was counting on: sear the 
world to meet with the 1858’s treaty countries and try to review the unbalance that 
Japan was imposed. This would also serve to build diplomatic relations with the other 
countries as well as to access how these places were in their internal structure and life, 
and what would be important to learn from that to the Japanese scenario. To this end, 
the emperor had given them powers of decision without needing for imperial 
intermediation.
23 Swale, Alistair, The Meiji REstoration Monarchism, Mass Communication and Conservative Revolution, 
2009, Britain, Palgrave Macmillan
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From Left to Right, the leaders of the Mission:  Kido Takayoshi, Yamaguchi 
Masuka, Iwakura Tomomi, Itō Hirobumi, Ōkubo Toshimichi. London, 1872
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iwakura_Mission
Tasked with such an important mission, the diplomats set sail to the United States as the 
first destination, confident that their endeavor would be successful. It can be said that 
the preemptive vision of the western world by its participants was moderately varied, 
from cautious awareness to blissful admiration. But the overall intent of the leaders 
seemed to converge more on the idea of learning what they could from the outside 
world and see what could and could not be implemented into the Japanese context. 
The delegation was well received by the Americans, but they had the impression of the 
members  being still quite inexperienced, and in initial negotiations one of the members 
had to return to Japan to get an even more prepared authorization from the emperor. 
They stayed a few months in the US, using their time to both observe and understand 
everything on the American life, from factories to schools, hospitals, institutions  and of 
course the matters of politics. This period served well to mature the expedition and 
prepare them to future interactions, but ultimately they were unsuccessful reviewing the 
treaties. Since it was an accord made between various nations, all of them would need to 
reach a consensus, so the American foreign minister didn’t want to preemptively sign 
any sort of deal and dealing with the others later, which would be a moral blow to the 
confidence of the Japanese. After this, they followed suit to London. There, they would 
end up meeting with the queen, aside from doing some valuable sightseeing and 
observation. They followed to a small tour of Europe, visiting places such as the 
recently war-torn France, Belgium and then Germany. This was invaluable as to assess 
how was the average life in the western countries, such as seeing the impacts of recently 
torn war France and in the end finding out that these countries were not that much more 
advanced than Japan, at least not on an impossible to reach position. Compromises 
could be made, but the catching up could be effective. These countries worked the way 
they did because there was an intersection between the industrial advancement, the 
political systems and the military. A very well set up triangle, in oversimplified terms. 
Unfortunately for some of the more avid and the interested observers – let us remember 
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that many of high profile Japanese politicians were amidst of the expedition – urgent 
matters pressed them to go home (Swale, 2009,  69-74 accounts for the details of the 
expedition). Saigo needed to be stopped.
The expedition had urgent matters to attend to back home.
Solving the First Meiji Political Crisis
As we’ve seen before, Saigo Takamori and the other Samurai leaders would end up 
heading the greatest uprisings of the Meiji Period – the Satsuma in particular even 
getting the privilege to be called a war in Japanese terminology (seinan sensô) – but 
things didn’t start in such a troublesome matter at the beginning. In fact, aside from the 
military support leading up to overthrowing the bakufu, amongst them the decisive 
victories at Toba-Fushimi and the Battle of Ueno – a feat which ended up granting him 
a statue on the place to this day – he was also one of the closest advisers of the emperor. 
It was partially his the idea of reforming the division of the domains into the modern 
Prefectures, which would help to unify the land politically and help shatter old 
structures of power. However, having a very on-hands warrior background and being 
directly in touch with an almost millennial social class, Saigo naturally would have 
other plans as to how to proceed from now on than his more cosmopolite and 
intellectual peers. His great schism point would be the Korean question, which requires 
some clear clarification. 
Korea didn’t recognize Japan’s new government and venture as a country in the same 
light as China. This was pouring salt into a historically sensitive wound to the Japanese 
pride. For almost all of its history, the governors of Japan tried to establish themselves 
as big as China, but from no avail from the country of the mainland, fueled by a 
successive streak of failures in establishing a firm footing in the Asian mainland, 
including numerous military campaigns, the Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s at the 16th being the 
most important and catastrophic of them all. In doing so, the Koreans were challenging 
the Japanese sovereignty, an act that demanded immediate military reprimand – to the 
view of Saigo and other samurai leaders. Needless to say, this would also greatly 
increase Japanese international presence and fulfill its long-dreamed imperial ambitions. 
When word of an adamant Saigo ready to launch an invasion to Korea reached the 
members in the Iwakura Mission, the immediate action was turn back and stop him of 
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pretty much ruining any positive momentum in a new age that the country might have 
had. 
As said previously in chapter 1, Ôkubo Toshimichi was one of the most important 
members of the high elite of the government and personal long – term friend of Saigo to 
disarm this ticking bomb to do something rash and stupid on international level (in the 
end it would be redirected on a national scale) with his detailed letter on why that was 
certainly a bad idea. Feeling that the new government was weak-willed, Saigo resigned 
in disgust, being followed l by many former samurai. We already know how the whole 
military matter with Satsuma ended, but the most important in this chapter is in 
understanding what changed after, something I will do within a few pages.
But to first understand what had changed, it is good to see what it was like before.
It is very historically arguable that the Japan that existed before the spec of the broader 
Meiji reforms was a fragmented Japan of warlords and an overly rigid political and 
social structure that barely thought about its average resident. The revolutionary 
government’s stance was that of the care of implementation of lasting institutions in an 
effort that tried to implement western institutions on the Japanese reality in an effort of 
stimulating an accelerated rate of modernization, added with specifics to a military 
organization impulse illustrated at this time by the motto of “fukoku kyôhei” because of 
fears of a possible western military invasion. But the meaning of building a nation in the 
notion of being Japanese might be a little different. Secluded from political life, 
commoners knew very little of the world or had a strong sense of identity aside from 
that spanning from local life such as towns or villages, due to historical settling of 
institutions in the Edo period that used these basic localities as a base of settlement, 
such as local temples assigned to specific villages and towns and so on. The ludicrous 
separation of Japanese territory into the hans of old, governed by rigid daimyo and the 
forbidding of commoners to travel from one domain to the other was also contributing 
to the matter. Besides that, there was not much to be gained in understanding the world 
on a practical level to the average man. The extremely rigid social system was set in 
such a way that if a commoner knew more than he was supposed to know by the eyes of 
the daimiyô, his very life would be easily endangered, considering samurai roaming 
around. And while it is arguable that some rich merchants and other smart commoners 
would easily have more knowledge than it would seem advisable, many knew how to 
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keep the low profile. Only during early Meiji the idea of kokumin entered Japanese 
vocabulary for the first time in history24. This idea that Japan had Japanese, but they 
were not citizens of Japan is an idea also somewhat shared by elites at the time. 
Fukuzawa Yukichi declared in 1875 that “in Japan there was a government but no 
nation (kokumin)25. So, this means that it was not enough for one to be ethnically 
Japanese and having the same set of values and language, but also engaging himself in a 
political conscience sense and truly becoming a citizen, as Carol Gluck has said, 
something that took quite the effort of both the central government as well as opposition 
from left or right26. Here, I am using the same definition as Eiko Ikegami of considering 
Citizenship as a set of negotiated relationships between the state and its members, 
entailing certain provisions for individuals’ rights and obligations that define their 
relationships (Ikegami, 1995,  2). Ikegami calls out for the simplification of the idea that 
Japan followed the Germanic example and was also put under the late development 
thesis of the past27 which simply doesn’t seem to hold up in the Japanese context, as in 
the German case the nation had been formed with a very specific case of political 
evolution spanning from the historical Germanic kingdoms who had a very complex 
political bureaucracy that ultimately ended up in unification because of forces propelled 
by capitalist expansion, which was not the case for Japan(Ikegami, 1995,  4-6). The 
overall ideology imbued with the effort of the unification and expansionism of the idea 
of Japan was based on the concepts of kokutai – an immutable spirit, represented by the 
Emperor and his perceived divinity – and seitai – which could be changeable. This was 
a particular case of the nineteenth century, as the imperial idea also symbolizing 
political power was not very present historically within Japan, and this attribution linked 
mainly to Iwakura Tomomi and his pupils Inoue Kowashi and Kaneko Kentaro was 
satisfying enough in the unification of the ideas of divine emperor and the political 
undertakings the Meiji leaders had in debates for the nation (Ikegami,  30, 214).
Turning Japan into what could be considered now a ‘true nation’ also brings in the idea 
of national identity, as the two notions are basically inseparable. Local identity – as said 
24 Ikegami, Eiko, Citizenship and National Identity in Early Meiji Japan, 1868-1889: A comparative 
Assessment, article published in 1995, International Review of Social History, Vol 40 Issue S3 
(Citizenship, Itentity and Social History)
25 Fukuzawa Yukichi, An Outline of a Theory of Civilization (1875), translated by David A. Dilworth and G. 
Cameron Hurst, Tokyo, Sophia University Press, 1973, 144
26 Gluck Carol, Japan’s Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton University Press, 1985
27 Moore, Social Origins; Richard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship, (2nd ed.,Berkeley, 1977); 
Michael Mann, “ruling class strategies and citizenship”, sociology, 21 (1987  339-354) 
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before the one associated with local town, village or han – could exist without the idea 
of nationality, that these places were but a minor note on the span of an entire country. 
But the emperor figure was one of the greater unifier figures of the concept, if not the 
greatest. I will talk more about the Emperor in detail on chapter 5, but for now I will say 
that the Emperor ratified in the religious sphere befalls upon Durkheim’s category of 
collective representations, being a symbol that came to represent an idea, beliefs and 
values elaborated by a collective and not reducible to individual constituents28. 
So in Japan, it was the nation which produced the national identity, not the other way 
around as was the case with Germany, France, Italy, Greece and other countries which 
went through a lengthy process of unification. Also, it was at this time that the 
government fully encompassed the before relatively ignored Hokkaido region. 
Ikegami’s paper also concurs that in the case of Japan, the formation of the industrial 
nationhood was not acted as a process of expanding internal pressures for externalizing 
capitalism, as it is usually the case for the European countries in their spurs of 
modernization and expansionism. Analyzing Japan’s history, we know that it was quite 
the contrary: central government was the precursor and even paternalistic guider of the 
capitalist expansion, which was side to side in its needs of ascertaining and to the 
objectives of establishing a strong military institution mainly built on fear, paranoia and 
a sense of urgency. 
If one looks at the Japanese military institution with a finality ending up in the Shôwa 
Fascism of World War II, then Hannah Arendt’s proposition that dictatorships – or in 
this case authoritarian governments – do not succeed without popular bases of support 
that there is no way that usually dictatorships or autocratic governments can be 
sustained without wide popular support29, but in the sense of creating that idea at first, 
one need to build that support somehow or get some sort of it from the local populace, 
either by creating or by process of recalling some sort of common point and tradition. 
This showcases the complex wide array and almost inseparable that the Japanese society 
of Meiji was formed on a initial period of overall agglomeration and separation of ideas 
put into practice in the form of institutions and political measures by a central 
government that was trying to encompass a sense of unity never before seen. This all 
fueled by a sense of somewhat urgency, demonstrated in the calling for a strong unified 
28 Durkheim, Émile, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, London, Allen & Unwin, 1964
29 Arendt, Hannah, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Cleveland, 1958,  306
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armed force, which recalled economic necessity, needing of political organization, 
which needed to be sustained by making measures that were not completely alien with 
some sort of justification for their implementation, which heeded the calling for old 
traditions and religions, which on their turn appealed for the people’s local sense on a 
first case, where everything makes a  connection on pulling the entire thread with it. 
This all, of course, being a gross simplification of the complex social, political, 
economical and even religious processes that took place at the disputed times of Meiji 
before the Sino-Japanese war.
The simple borrowing of foreign institutions that Japan tried to do in the early Meiji had 
a conjecture of negative reactions that had to be revised by the 1880s and entering into 
the 1890s adapted to the Japanese reality and shifted for its values. In accounts such as 
education and religion, there was a relative tentative for older figures in tradition such 
as Confucianism, Buddhism and Shintoism to claim as a more national character of the 
“Japanese spirit”, with institutions often reflecting  (or trying to) that, such as the 
educational system30. The military however seems an odd case unto this analysis, 
because even though it was heavily dependent on modernization and deepening of the 
overall machine – from conscription to active military force and technological 
modernization – It fared extremely well in its ventures. but why so? Even with an initial 
contrary reaction to it, its showcase is often weirdly doubled down given that it was 
perhaps the most successful institution of Meiji Japan, able to guarantee both basic 
concepts for a nation such as national defense against foreign threat as well as a very 
successful indoctrination of values, morality and pervading into the de facto social life 
of the people in at least an ideological way ever since childhood. The idea of kokutai 
promulgating an obedience to the imperial figure, which came to be inculcated ever 
since early school years, could be analogous to accounts of western discipline and 
patriotic spirit, whereas in the cult for the Emperor, he was synonymous with the 
Nation.  Japan’s formation of a modern nation-state took place upon a contested terrain 
that required ‘working out a relationship between conflicting identities’31. The 
enthusiasm felt in the 80s was a prospect of new beginnings. There was an overall sense 
of urgency in the nation that Japan needed to form kokumin and kokka: Japan needs 
Japanese, it was not enough for one to be born in Japan only, and as such, Japan had the 
30 De Bary, Gluck, Tiedemann, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 1600 to 2000, Volume Two, Part Two: 1868 
to 2000, 2005, Education in Meiji Japan
31 Tetsuo Najita, Japan: The Intellectual Foundations of Modern Japanese Politics ,Chicago, 1974,  148
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institutions that preceded an ideological basis or assumed to take the risk of “choosing 
one” as their official objectives (Gluck, 1985,  21-25). This feeling would be 
represented in many forms in energy.
Evolution With Challenge: Enter the Jiyû Minken, Politics and the 
Fulfillment of Japanese Citizenry
The Rebellion of Satsuma in 1877 was a rather local event that despite demanding a 
large amount of soldiers and a huge mobilization from the government certainly did not 
make many direct impacts within the society; however its indirect influence was 
immense in what would follow in Japanese history. In a way, both the war itself and the 
aftermath were catalysts for another series of changes that would sweep the country. It 
provided with some very important inspections upon governmental life such as the 
opportunity of proving the (in)efficacy of the military system at the time, which was 
still on its infancy, propagating a self-conscious assessment of military leaders to base 
upon a restructuration effort32. The years after the war would be those of grievance, 
hardships and economic difficulties, making many aspects of life worse, which were not 
immediately addressed with the measures taken Minister of Finances Matsukata 
Masayoshi in the years to follow, but his measures would ultimately stabilize Japanese 
economy, unifying the bank system and start integrating the industrialization more and 
more, which would impact directly the people’s lives who left the countryside to work 
in the new undertaking of factories; the opportunity for the government to fully focus on 
the rest of its political implementations, now having rid itself from a more radical 
remnants of the old oligarchic system, even though some notable conservatives 
politicians and officials such as Yamagata Aritomo were on the rise at the time. So 
much so that it was just after the Satsuma Rebellion that the talks of a promised 
constitution seemed to truly begin, in parallel with the rise of the jiyû minken undo; the 
educational system would undergo a reform too, concurrently with the military system 
where the two would become the pillar of imperial Japanese indoctrination upon the 
average person. In many aspects, the jiyû minken was a venture never before seen for 
the Japanese populace. The fervors of the time in searching for knowledge coming from 
the west also meant in the search of their political ideas, which were starkly contrasting 
32 Drea, Edward J, Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853-1945, University Press of Kansas, 2009, 
46
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with historical Japanese intellectual thinking, which tended to appear conservative. 
Basically, this was the opportunity of demonstrating discontent in a different way than 
the traditionally known rallying in arms – and risk getting crushed by the military, as it 
usually happened at the period (Cambridge,  368 – 402). It is important to note that the 
movement on itself was not unified and had many different facets: former government 
officials, former samurai who had no access to the upper spheres of power, newspapers, 
political societies of discussions, merchants, teachers, and all of those were proponents 
for the social and political changes and had some sort of schooling and living conditions 
that supported some reading; In sum, all of those who were barred from power and saw 
the oligarchs and cliques forming around them as adversaries to be taken down in the 
political realm. Perhaps the most claimed of the measures asked in various petitions and 
protests were those retaining the constitution, claiming the promises made in the first 
chapter of the Charter Oath when Emperor Mutsuhito took the throne. 
Despite being more complicated to hit and disarm given their nature of permeating into 
different sects of society and not be contained within a group or a locality, the 
government was able to combat the issue. Political parties, which were formed around 
great leaders who had claims had organizational problem enough making them mostly 
dissolve from the inside on the early decade of the 1880s (they would be revived later, 
before the Diet in order to prepare for the elections, but on another context); the press 
could – and was – attacked within ordinances and censorship; local town and village 
leaders, who were champions for the movements – some of those who were elected by 
vote starting from 1878 as a measure to appease local unrests – could be barred by 
governors tied to the central government and not exert much power, laws for public 
order such as the Ordinance on Public Meetings by 1880 and a reorganization of the 
police force around gave a more pronounced use of violence in urban spaces. This was a 
victory for the central government in quelling the political spirit of the decade 
(Cambridge, 411-426). The great police operation led by Yamagata in person made a 
serious threat to banish individuals seemed as “dangerous” or “subversive” from a 
distance from the imperial palace or from the city, if he deemed needed, and he gave 
orders to shoot if one of those subjects tried to react, purging around 570 away from the 
capital33. Ironically, the constitution that would be promulgated in 1889 would severely 
33 Hackett, F. Roger, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838-1922, Harvard University 
Press: 1971,  106
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limit the sayings of the press and restrict some liberties of speech and political 
gatherings. It is as like the people had surrendered a little of their newfound voice in 
dialogue and needing to lend it to their elected representatives for the matter.  There was 
no need for the government to have conceded such a wide array of rights for the people, 
even with rampant conservatism and repression, but there was genuine worry from the 
leaders, and from the people themselves asking for participation in granting this right to 
them in reaching this compromise. It is also important to note that maybe the mere 
notion of granting a constitution was an effort in elevating to the same ladder as the 
western powers, when the central government was still in its spurs of modernization, 
adaptation from western ideas and the need to look more “civilized” and advanced in 
order to undo the unfair treaties of 1858 that were still not solved by the end of the 
century. Like this, the holders of power were stepping down from a previously 
unreachable altar and establishing dialogue and relations through institutions and 
measures that greatly affected the livelihoods of the people, also being affected by them.
But to all intents and purposes, the election was pretty much the political realization of 
the people, even with limited seats in the diet and such a limitation on voting populace. 
One could also join the military or if he had conditions to study and specialize. 
An utilitarian approach in the making of a new Japanese national identity perceivable by 
Ito’s conviction that in the lack of a religion such as Christianity, he used the figure of 
the emperor in tying tradition, religion, recognizable national figure and politics, even 
though to him the idea of a constitution served to “limit the power of the sovereign and 
to protect the rights of subjects”, even these being quite weirdly contradictory (Ikegami, 
31). To Ikegami, it was the set of interactions between opposition movements, no matter 
if by right or left, and the Meiji oligarchy, that crystallized the distinctive identity of 
Japanese pre-war nationhood – the so-called kokutai – and expanded the authority of the 
emperor, a figure which was absent from the political sphere. It almost feels like he was 
a mere observer adult in a tug of war between children that were claiming for the 
support of their parent. As we know that in the end, it was still the oligarchic wing that 
kept the power, but it changed its internal structure in response to those foreign bodies 
within the new organization of politics. 
Already a little more matured on its political institutions, having been with the Diet 
system for more than a decade and bolstering the impact of waves of political 
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happenings such as the Sino-Japanese war, the Russo-Japanese war and the greater 
articulation of parties and the alliance with Britain, the government ideology, if there 
was any seemed a little more divided, with different ministries and entities with 
different goals to sometimes the same parcel of the population (Gluck, 1985,  9). Public 
figures, journalists and intellectuals represented a strong parcel that was capable of 
producing a relevant “public opinion” on disproportionate amount, and were frequently 
critical of more middle-ground measures by the government instead of pursuing more 
drastic measures. Considering the government could be seen as already conservative, 
this can come as surprising (Ibid,  10). There were mainly based on urban spheres of 
influence (Ibid,  11). Effective linking from the central government to more localized 
perceived institutions which were capable of enormous social mobilization and 
propagation of ideas has been defined as one of the great conquests of the Meiji Period. 
There was a genuine worry in reaching the faraway population on the rural and more 
distant areas, arguing that the great urban populations were not so targeted by the 
movements of ideology and the necessity of influence (Ibid, 13). The great purge made 
by Yamagata in 1877 might have been one of the reasons as to why there seemed to 
have a lesser sense of urgency in attending the matters of the urban sphere, as well as 
more palpable measures of modernity and new age such as urban infrastructure and 
modern day life commodities in contrast to a still belated atmosphere on the 
countryside. This also created a sense of rivalry between urban and rural Japan, with the 
former thinking the other was a relic of the past while the latter thought that the urban 
sphere was the only one benefitting from the so called modernization (Hane, 1982,  21-
26); We’ll see later in chapter 4 a bit of how effective were some measures in the spans 
of imperial education and indoctrination taking into account the institutions of education 
and the military. 
There is also the need to consider that not all within Japanese territory were to be 
included in the full view of citizenship and sense of “Nihonjin”. As described by Tessa 
Morris-Suzuki in her book, Re-inventing Japan: Time, Space, Nation ( 20-44, 73-106), 
communities seen as historically contested or peripheral – such as was the case of 
Hokkaido and Okinawa – were prone to very complicated social questions of both being 
assimilated into Japan and being rejected by it in virtue of many factors such as 
languages, political organizational history and ethnicity, which is a great account of 
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how the central government faced questions such as perceived unity and national 
identity.
Chapter 4 – Soldier Making, from mind to behavior. Founding 
Militarism on Education
Education, aspiration and molding subjects
 If there was one institution in Meiji Era which carried the greater responsibility of 
propagating imperialistic ideas, it was the educational system. In fact, considering how 
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this system and the military would eventually be meld together, they would be praised 
in Yamagata Aritomo’s writings as being part of the same system, as seen from below:
“if boys enter grammar school at six, high school at thirteen, and graduate at 
nineteen, after which from their twentieth year, they spend a few years as 
soldiers, in the end all will become soldiers and no one will be without 
education. In due course, the nation will become a great civil and military 
university. 34
They could even be thought as the same institutional entity applied in different contexts 
and by different means. In a very rough simplification, while the education system 
would prepare the young (mainly men in regards to military practical duty) to receive 
national values and be subjects to a first and basic wave of indoctrination, preparing 
many to be more susceptive of the idea of joining the military if they couldn’t climb 
above to receive further education. This would be an important first step in creating 
loyal and well-educated soldiers. If they did not pursue military career, they could 
become academically trained to serve the nation already greatly imbued in those 
militaristic values, and those who would not pursue any career could have received at 
least the basic literacy and moral understanding. Like this, the government had created a 
situation of almost complete win-win in pursues of trying to ascertain itself politically, 
mentally and morally. Linking a nationalistic notion of servitude as widespread as 
possible to be converted into actual military power was one of the great reasons of the 
impressive success the Japanese imperial army had in its duration, even more 
considering the short span of time from installment to fulfillment, going in accordance 
of what Hannah Arendt had commented that dictatorships are unsuccessful without 
popular bases of support35. 
Education and military reform in Meiji were mostly results of a somewhat well defined 
national program, even if apparently confused at first. However, the approach of 
learning by trial and error in addition to necessity of implementation being suffocated 
by geopolitical trends was what ultimately held the system together, even more when 
considering the transplantation of systems and institutions from other countries and 
34 Yamagata Aritomo, 1873. From Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 
1838 – 1922 (Cambridge, 1971), 65
35 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (Cleveland, 1958), p. 306.
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applying them to the Japanese context. In this regard, the idea of fukoku Kyôhei could 
be seen as very successful already in the Meiji Period, with the military expansionist 
conquests being at the top. 
Education was a topic in which the Meiji period had also its fair share of challenges, 
amounting to the others it already had. However, it is relatively easy to separate the 
necessity in educational reform into two fronts: institutions for higher learning and the 
average schools destined to the everyman and common people. I’ll focus more on the 
analysis on the latter, but one thing that must be said about the former is its character of 
being molded towards the objective of serving as a good ground for the formation of a 
new specialized class of individuals who would go to become lawyers, engineers and so 
on, specialized jobs that any nation can be very well served of, mainly ones going 
through spurs of modernization.  Given the nature of being expensive and encompassing 
a very little parcel of the population on this, it also served as a sort of natural means of 
the propagation and maintain the power for the elites. For both systems, it seems a word 
would define them very well: utilitarian. 
As one of the main practical actions spurring from the Charter Oath of 1868, mainly 
retaining to articles three and five as a more direct approach for commoners to pursue 
education and personal aspirations, at least in theory, a first national plan of education 
would be set in the second half of 1872 after much discussion on its approach and 
subjects a national plan called the Gakusei (Fundamental Code of Education, a word 
that would birth the word meaning “Student”) was to be followed. A very westernized 
approach of self-improvement, reaching for learning and enlightenment and 
utilitarianism for the estate was the one that they initially took, starkly contrasting with 
old views on education derived from shinto and buddhist traditions that were the 
commonplace in pre-Meiji Japanese education. The greater approach between the 
education and military would come a decade later, however, with the first decade 
having rough results. Implementing a never before seen system that challenged the daily 
lives limitations of the early Meiji population and enforcing that schools, as well as 
conscription sites, would be paid with their tax money was a sure way to make the 
measure unpopular in the first place. Angry riots destroyed at least two thousand 
schools, with this number representing as close as 10% of the total number of schools at 
the time, with passive evasion ranging at an astounding 25 to 50% rate of evasion36. The 
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reformation would also accompany a general reformulation of the estate in the 
following decade considering the great spending of the estate resulting from the 
Satsuma Rebellions, commercial balance and the Matsukata Economics reshaping the 
political body. Education was more of a direct impact of the perceived relative poor 
performance of the army in quelling the Satsuma Rebellion37.  As a result of the 
switching trends of the time, and apparently after being personally viewed by the 
Emperor during visits to school, the Emperor was personally keen on taking a firmer 
stance towards reforming the education38.  A new Educational Law was proclaimed by 
the emperor himself (kyôikurei) in 1879 and later approving the imperial rescript on 
education (kyôgaku taishi). Mori Arinori taking charge of the new movement for 
renewal in the 1886s (first minister of education,  a figure with a very interesting 
biography39) , with the claim from the emperor being way more effective than that of a 
westernized style of free-thought and pursuing knowledge, as it was very unpopular 
amongst the masses. With Arinori, also backed by other intellectuals such as Fukuzawa 
Yukichi, the division in approach between upper education and basic education would 
become even clearer: moralistic and form of civic indoctrination also adhering to 
military values complete with drills and military uniforms for boys and a ‘subservient 
good-wife good-mother’ for girls in the basic sphere, while the academic life would 
enjoy a very good bon-vivant status in pursuing knowledge and opening a way of life 
then-new to the Japanese context. This would be portrayed in romances and novels 
throughout the country (Gordon, 2002,  67 – 68). Mori’s own vision was not fully 
represented in the system itself, with a few problems arising such as centralization 
versus locality and conflict of morals approached academically. In a broad way, it was 
as if the system would get to be a bit more relaxed and open ended the further one 
would climb up the academic ladder, with a few limits to not ferment too much of a 
free-thinkers as tending to dangerous radicalism and revolutionary ideas such as 
socialism, republicanism or liberalism. Mori was also a great advocate of unifying a 
more militaristic approach to discipline and applying them to the school context. His 
views would mirror ideals such as individuals serving the goals of the nation, morality, 
36 Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, Modern Revolution, 1868 – 1905, 68
37 Ikuda, Nihon rikungushi, 38
38 W.M. Theodore, De Bary, Carol Gluck, Arthur Diedemann, Sources of Japanese Tradition, 1600 to 
2000, Volume 2, 1868 to 2000, Second Edition, Columbia University Press, 922
39 A more detailed  acount about Arinori’s personal life and philosofies can be seen in Ivan Parker Hall’s 
book, Mori Arinori
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introduction of a military-based physical training, introduced through writings of his 
own (Military-Style Physical Training, or Heikishiki Taisô). Mori’s more complete view 
can be seen on another writing of his own in Hall’s book40. His grand objective was not 
that to instill the idea of future military training into the minds of children, but leaning 
more on the disciplinary and moral side of military education.
Another great figure on defining the late Meiji education was Motoda Nagazane. He 
was helped in his sayings by Takasaki Masakaze, Sasaki Takayuki, Hijikata Hisamoto, 
Yoshii Tomozane in planning and compiling an ethics of education based on kokutai, 
and he saw “doctrine” in the spiritual sense of “study” and “education”. He produced a 
draft of aims of imperial education and after checking with Itô Hirobumi, he finished 
the imperial thoughts on education, promulgated in 1879, with the 1881 outline for 
elementary school rules reiterating ethics education that embraced the ideal of the 
previous document elevating “loyalty to the court and love of the country”41. With 
distribution in 1882 of Motoda’s essentials for childhood education to all schools this 
became the core of ethics education (Katsube and Shibukawa 1984 30-38).
There was a conflict between followers of Motoda using those ethics as unique Japanese 
national doctrine with those of Itô, Arinori and Fukuzawa Yukichi insisting that ethics 
should be based on restraint and practicality, with Motoda’s draft in the regional chief’s 
meeting of 1890 being recognized as reflecting the intent of the Meiji Emperor on 
importance of moral education (Susumu and Murphy). It was a rare case amongst 
Japanese political life that an agreement of such central figures in government and 
governmental thinking would come to “lose” over a debate or question. After the 
assassination of Arinori in 1889, Motoda became the pretty much leader on concerns 
about education. 
Middle-schools served as a mid point to them, but only the richer and living well 
families could afford it, mainly because the system as made such as to have only one 
middle school per prefecture, which would severely limit the option of attendance of 
many coming from more remote regions and with no conditions of sending a child away 
for studying.  By 1890 the non-samurai families in middle schools rose above 50%42. 
40 Hall, Ivan Parker, Mori Arinori, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973
41 Shimazono Susumu and Regan E. Murphy, State Shinto in the Lives of the People: The Establishment of 
Emperor Worship, Modern Nationalism, and Shrine Shinto in Late Meiji, article published in Japanese 
Journal of Religious Studies, Vol. 36, No 1, Helen Hardacre and the Study of Japanese Religion (2009),  
93-124, Published by Nanzan University, 108
66
The imperial rescript on education of 1890 was proclaimed. This new rescript would be 
used as ammunition by more traditional and Confucian-shinto derived nationalists and 
evoked as a document to be shown along the imperial image and used as a basis for 
nationalism, but the leaders by the end of the century had a rather cautionary approach 
to unrelenting nationalism – such as we’ve seen before on the debates involving Motoda 
and his followers – , even ones who were at the top of a very conservative approach 
such as Saionji Kinmochi. The idea of local governments being in charge of accepting 
or not textbooks would end by 1903 in a called “textbook Scandal”, prompting a 
reformation from the Diet (Sources of Japanese Tradition,  870 – 871). In a way, it 
served to further unify the ideas of moral and civil conscience push, as all of the 
publications to be taught in school were made and published by the ministry of 
education. 
The Case of Universal Conscription and its initial application
An army is made of soldiers. This much is very obvious, however this affirmation lies 
above some other questions that may accompany it: who are the soldiers? How are they 
made? To be a soldier, semantically, means just being a part of an armed force, 
however, given the special case in the Japanese landscape this deserves a further 
dwelling in the question. But what does it mean in context? What does it mean to be a 
soldier? 
Despite the word “conscription” usually meaning the universal conscription that most 
nations used or use – some even to this day – it was not until 1873 that this came to be 
in Japanese soil. This doesn’t mean that there was no attempt at recruiting soldiers ever 
since the restoration happened in 1868. After the conflict, there was the immediate need 
of troops to defend the capital and the imperial court, and also the necessity to totally 
pacify the remaining points of insurgence to the new government or popular uprisings. 
This force was naturally chosen amongst some of the forces that served in the Boshin 
War and were the temporary army until the situation could be fully settled. They also 
acted as police in the capital and as the Imperial Guard.  The first requisition order by 
the new government came in April of 1868, and it would take until January of 1873 for 
the universal conscription law to finally arrive. Some additional steps were taken until 
42 WM. Theodore, Carol Gluck, Arthur E. Tiedeman, Sources of Japanese Tradition 1600 to 2000, Volume 
Two, Part Two: 1868 to 2000, 84
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its definitive version with the universal conscript at the final order. On 1871, the new 
government was able to recruit an army of around 10.000 samurai recruited from 
restoration forces. In 1872, all of the lower samurai (sôtsuzoku) were declared 
commoners (heimin). On November 28 of 1872, it was declared that a law would soon 
be enacted which would make eligible all people. The War ministry (hyôbushô) finally 
enacted the Chôheirei in January 10 of 1873. Primarily based upon the French and 
Prussian regulation with changes for the specifics of Japan, the draft consisted of a 
statement of the principles that relate to the organization of an army and general rules 
thereof, along with five chapters. Some of the ordinances said as bellow.
 Service as a National Duty – all male subjects of the Empire, seventeen to forty 
years of age, were to be available for service and are to be registered as such. 
They are to serve either in the army or the navy.
 Kinds of Service – the army consists of the regulars, the reserves and the militia, 
the service and the duties varying accordingly. The regular or actual service is 
obligatory upon men who are fully 20 years of age, from whom the requisite 
number is obtained by drawing. Three years in regular army (jôbigun), two in 
second reserve (daini kôbigun). All able bodied men between 17 and 40 were 
considered members of kokumingun (National Guard) in times of crisis, such as 
foreign invasion. The time for serving could be extended in emergency 
situations. Men from 20 years of age were to be presented at the examination 
site. 
 Specialization in service – both regulars and reserves were to be distributed 
according to stature and abilities into five classes: artillery, cavalry, infantry, 
engineering and commissariat. Those who were exceptional in body and 
character had the prospect to be promoted as Imperial Guards.
There was also an extensive list of exemptions. Criminals and people of ill 
health were the most obvious cases and would not be accepted. If the subject 
would have a temporary disease at the time of presentation or the mourning 
period of 3 weeks for the death of one of his parents hadn’t finished, or if there 
was a grave circumstance at his home to make it impossible to attend, he had to 
present himself in the following year and stating the cause to a magister. Other 
situations in which the service – sans the National Guard Army – was exempt 
were those bellow 1,55m of height; the deformed, with venereal diseases or 
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congenitally weak; governmental or prefectural officials; trainees in military or 
naval service or living in military or naval schools; students specializing in the 
public schools, teaching, engineering, the colonial department, medicine or 
studying abroad; heads of families (kôshu); heirs and lineal grandsons or only 
son or grandson; those attending home affair in place of father or elder brother, 
who are sick or otherwise disabled; adopted sons (yôshi); brothers of those who 
are already in service and those who could pay the very high amount of 270 yen 
at the time43.
From all of the recorded eligible males of joining the military, by the time of 
1875 when conscription finally came to be on a national level, only 2.4% 
eligible men were serving the army44.  Given the great amount of exemptions, 
people actively trying to dodge the draft and just looking at the numerous 
problems, complications and a situation of change, and this apparently small 
number comes as of no surprise. Aritomo Yamagata sent to the throne a 
memorial in 1872 advocating the adoption of universal military service instead 
of a volunteer professional force would actually be less costly. This gave to him 
the account of seeking yasuagari no guntai by some historians45.  The irony is 
that it was not so much of a problem this low rate, as a man who was not serving 
would be most likely helping the crops or working to help the household to pay 
government taxes, so it was a win-win situation for the government. Still, the 
government increased the garrisons from 4 to 6. Those were: Tokyo, Sendai, 
Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and Kumamoto46. There is no way to actually 
ascertain the number of conscripts drafted from each place in the period of 1873-
1877. However, in 1873 the total force of the army was composed of:
 Standing Army: 31,680人
 First Reserve: 21,120人
 Second Reserve: 21,120人

  From 1873 to 1879, the army corps were divided as follows:
 Infantry, 14 regiments
43 Gotaro Ogawa, Yasuma Takata, Conscription System in Japan, New York, Oxford University Press, 1921, 
[Digitalized Version] 11-16
44 Katô, Chôheisei to kindai Nihon, 20. This number did not increase substantially until 1880.
45 Kikuchi, Chôhei kihi no kenkyû, 34.
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With no surprise, fully abiding those rules was hard, even more so due to the new nature 
of the law, to varied degrees. 
The very first problem came from the massive desertion from the samurai on 1873 
although that could be seen as coming with little surprise, since they were vividly 
against the universal conscription on the first place. While many  samurai went on to a 
vocal only protest, and another substantial portion still stayed within the army (until 
1876, former samurai still outnumbered new conscripts), others were not ashamed to 
bear in arms in revolt, and cause uprisings. The biggest and most important of these 
samurai revolts was the Satsuma Rebellion, which final result would end once and for 
all the history of samurai in Japan, coupled with an edict abided by 1876 which 
abolished the class of bushi as a whole. The former ones who still were in the army, 
police or Imperial Guard still antagonized with new recruits, usually because of social 
prejudice and with the help of alcohol.
 One of the greatest preoccupations of the military was on the morality of the system as 
a whole. Punishment and discipline – sometimes meaning the same – could be 
accounted as one of the most important aspects of the whole machinery relating to the 
training and indoctrination of soldiers. A system of punishment, verbal abuse and 
humiliation was informally put in motion, aside from a strict regimen of official 
punishments adopted in the early 1880s mainly from the French such as torture of war 
prisoners, disobedience to orders, rape, desertion and mutiny, also linking to the idea 
that being able to withstand pain and harsh conditions was a crucial part of what the 
rescript of 1882 and the perceived Japanese spirit were about. It is important to note that 
it was especially effective on Japanese poor children and subsequently men, as they 
were more exposed to uniform ideas than those seem as “subversive” from movements 
such as the jiyû minken who would be easier to come in contact to by living in packed 
cities. Despite the constant abuses and humiliations, this grew a sense that the average 
soldier was better than any civilian, being called as the base for the emperor and the 
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nation47.  After the Satsuma rebellion was crushed, the government’s financial political 
decisions, coupled with a shift of worry after the assassination of Ôkubo contributed to 
the general discontent of the remaining soldiers and they seemed to join the Idea of 
political rights movements (Drea, 2009,  47), also fueled by reduction of 5 percent of 
the soldiers payment and a decision of the council of state reducing the ministries 
budget by 20% on December 1877 (Tobe, Gyakusetsu, 53; Kuwada, “Nisshin Sensô 
Mae”,  8). The worry about military officers associated with people’s rights movements 
was very real and palpable in examples. Some incidents in 1879 happened where the 
police arrested enlisted men plotting to assassinate their command officer or the case of 
a soldier who threatened to bomb the imperial castle48.  As a response to this, Yamagata 
would publish Admonition to Soldiers (gunjin kunkai), being a precursor of the Imperial 
Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors (1882).
Problems involving recruits, while not as troublesome or numerous as usually samurai 
caused – were still a constant of the life in the barracks. Soldiers who picked up fights, 
spent too much with prostitutes and drinking or caused problems to the local population. 
In fact, they were not entirely wholesome about having a bunch of men with a lot of 
energy living nearby, and the Army Ministry required the garrisons to report annually 
on town-unit relations and severe disciplinal problems.
Desertions were also in the range of everyday problems. The prospects were very 
similar: a soldier went out someday, sold his uniform, bought new clothes and then 
merged again with the crowd far away from his garrison, sometimes even returning 
home. Some definitely not being as smart as to not call too much attention and 
committing crimes and were captured back49.
The populace would also cause an array of problems. Families and small communities 
were less than happy as to hear they could lose a son to the army and with it help on 
their working force. A revision to the tax system also came out at the same year that put 
47 Mikiso Hane, Peasants, Rebels & Outcasts, the underside of Modern Japan  59,morals and more; 
(Ichinose Toshiya, Meiji, Taishô, Shôwa guntai manyuuaru [military pamphlets of the meiji, taisho and 
showa periods] (kôbunsha, 2004), 81; Yui, “Meiji Shoki no kengun kôsô”, 482; kumagai tadasu, teikoku 
rikukaigun, 251-253; Tsurumi et al., Nihon no Hyakunen III:79-80; Toshio iritani, Group psychology of the 
Japanese in wartime (London: Kegan Paul, 1991)
48 Ôshima Akiko, “Iwayuru Takebashi Jihen no “yoha’ ni tsuite” [concerning the after-effects of the so-
called Takebashi incident], Gunji Shigaku 32:3 (December 1996),  34-35, 42, 44
49 Detailed accounts of everyday life in the barracks can be seen in detail on Colin D. Jaundrill’s book, 
Samurai to Soldier: Remaking Military Service in Nineteenth-Century Japan, Ithaca and Londo, 2016, 
Cornell University Press 
71
a bigger burden on the dependence of labor, and many young men simply didn’t want to 
spend their lives in the military. Many communities were eager to help hiding their 
younglings when the time came for the examination. Since most of the work of leading 
the men to the examination site and filling in important documents about their 
characteristic had to be done by local leaders, this was not particularly hard or 
troublesome. There was also the curious fact that since adoptees (yôshi) were exempt of 
the draft, the families used this as a means to avoid having their sons taken to the army. 
It was somewhat common that an adoptee would even still be living in his original 
residence. Some cases of popular resistance even came in the form of violence with 
revolts that had to be pacified by the army. As we’ve seen before, the usage of terms 
such as “Blood Tax” in the official texts didn’t help much the cause.
For those who ended up recruited, life would change dramatically. For many, the simple 
prospect of going from a rural area to serve in a garrison in a big city should already be 
thrilling enough. Of course, their objective was not go there to play. They had to abide 
by new rules, duties and get used to following strict orders, while also learning to 
operate new machinery.  In 1873, the government abolished the old system of 
measuring time and adopted a western clock-based one, and while this would little 
mean to most of the populace until the mass arrival of trains, clocks and other 
machinery, the military abided by it firmly50. The daily routine would be somewhat like 
this: presentation at 5:30 a.m. or 6:00 a.m. (depending on the season). Then, breakfast, 
lunch at noon, dinner after the afternoon’s events and lights out 30 minutes after the 
bugler played taps, under the risk of punishment of infracting51. While a life of military 
drills and exercising could be tiring, for some the prospect of eating 3 times a day would 
be something new. There was also the concept of konnichi bunka no kuni to guide the 
discipline in the barracks. A soldier should behave as it was expected from one of a 
cultured and modern nation, so acts of disrespect, formation of gangs, extreme 
drunkenness and lack of hygiene were passive of punishment. 
 Society, Military Ethos and a case for National - Bushido?
50 Yoshida Yutaka, Nihon no Guntai: Ichiheishitachi no kindai-shi
51 Rikugunshô, Hohei naimusho, 2nd Ed. (Tokyo: Rikungushô, 1875). It was up to the regimental 
commander to decide the daily Schedule
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The separation between a common citizen and a soldier was very clear, with soldiers 
constantly having problems in terms of disciplinary action and feeling superiors. It is 
not like there is a need for someone to be a soldier in order to be a good subject to the 
emperor. And the emperor also carries what it means to be Japanese. To be Japanese IS 
to have the emperor and to follow him. Being a soldier and a citizen didn’t mean the 
same thing as in a Spartan or Roman meaning were there was not a separate sect of 
society responsible for war, but these people who once were barred from exercising the 
power of violence through the estate now could have full access to it (at least men) and 
being completely politicized. Army is a political tool that tried to distance itself from 
political machinations: at least that was the intent of the leaders to the common soldier. 
A document emitted in 1882 by the emperor (in actuality written by Inoue Kowashi and 
Yamagata Aritomo) was promulgated to widespread the militaristic values of the ideal 
soldier, in a document made to be memorized by every soldier and sailor in the nation. 
Of special importance to it, there is the focus on imbuing a sense of obedience to 
authority, serving the national interests, avoiding senses of heroism from the past and 
focusing on routine and continuous duty, but most important of all that the ideal soldier 
or sailor shouldn’t be involved with politics, and that was a national danger. Ironic, 
considering that Yamagata himself did that all the time. It can even be said that such a 
thing is impossible on its own, as militarism itself is a political manifestation, along 
with wars and budget approvals, mainly the latter as it involved directly the civilian 
politicians. Nevertheless, the army did hold extreme power, and soldiers did hold 
extremely valuable social values that would be absorbed into others. Yoshida Yutaka’s 
book on the Japanese Army (Nihon no Guntai: Ichiheishitachi no kindai-shi) could be 
seen as a great compilation of how the values, and even simple ordinances of everyday 
life introduced through the military such as the widespread use of shoes, clocks, sense 
of punctuality and even ways of walking would make a great impact in understanding 
the influence of the military institution into normal civilians.
But there was still the need of some sort of philosophy that greatly captured the zeitgeist 
of the Japanese people and makes its appeal. Eric Hobsbawn argues that invention of 
tradition happens to ‘occur more frequently when a rapid transformation of society 
weakens or destroys the social patterns for which ‘old’ traditions had been designed’52, 
52 Hobsbawm, Eric J., ‘Introduction: inventing traditions’, in Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The 
invention of tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge university press), p4-5
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and that they can have three types:  a) those establishing or symbolizing social cohesion 
or the membership of groups, real or artificial communities, b)those establishing or 
legitimizing institutions, status, or relations of authority and c)those whose main 
purpose was socialization, the inculcation of beliefs, value systems and conventions of 
behavior.  They also are very prone to happen in countries undergoing an imperial 
spree, even clearer in the Japanese case because of its adoption in expansionism and 
imperialism derived almost directly from the western way. In this context, there was a 
sort of revival and reinterpretation of Bushido to be used in imperial goals, spanning in 
the beginning from nationalist intellectuals.  
But there are some strong connotations in using the term of Bushido. In the first place, it 
isn’t and it never was a unified mentality, so it would be easier to say ‘bushidos’ and 
their types, who wrote them and who followed them. However, the lack of plural in 
Japanese language makes it easier to miss when translating it to English, and even by a 
Japanese viewpoint one might confuse Bushido as something entirely unified. 
Fred Davis arguments that the case of yearning for past traditions ‘whatever in our 
present situation evokes it, nostalgia uses the past – falsely, accurately, or… in specially 
reconstructed ways – but it is not a product thereof’53. According to Oleg Benesch on his 
book Inventing the Way of the Samurai: Nationalism, internationalism, and Bushidô in 
Modern Japan(Oxford Press, 2014) this would be exactly what happened in the 
Japanese case, seeing as the samurai thinkers at the period close to the end of the 
bakumatsu would recall older traditions to justify a present weakness. To Oleg, the idea 
is that modern bushido was given as a result spanning from three different trends that 
were permeating the Japanese national thinking on the period: normalization of relations 
to the west, increase of negativity in the view of china (a country which by almost all of 
Japanese history was seen as a cultural and symbolic guideline) and the establishment of 
the Japanese national pride (11). To me, essentially, the idea of the Japanese nation 
bushido becoming something more than it should be has its tricks. It was not that the 
Japanese national identity was synonym with bushido, but apparently one would think 
that this was certainly a “unique characteristic” and characteristic for it given the impact 
that the Japanese army would have within the population leading up to the creation of 
the Japanese associations for reservist officers, retired officers and youngsters. He calls 
53 Yearning for Yesterday: A Sociology of Nostalgia, 1979, 10-11.
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that the formation of Meiji Japan’s forms of Bushido spanned mainly in relation to 
western ideals of chivalry, knighthood and gentlemanship, that were very well accepted 
by foreigners (Oleg,  74-75) and still lingers in simplistic representations of Japanese 
culture spanning from the west to this day, in no small part due to propagation of 
modern popular media such as movies. Motion pictures such as “Karate Kid” (1984) 
and “The Last Samurai” (2003) still propagate erroneous ideas to an acknowledged 
person on the matter of what are the Japanese values. The main proposers of a 
reviewing of Bushido to be reused in those times pre-war were Fukuzawa Yukichi, 
Uemura Masahisa, Suzuki Chikara and Ozaki Yukio. Their personal ties with the class 
of bushi (all of them were former samurai) also explains why they wanted to pursue an 
idealized past to make face to other parts of the world. Despite that, very little of what 
they proposed for the discourse of bushido was kept on subsequent decades, being 
usually prone to heavy criticism and refusal by more chauvinist nationalists who would 
incorporate the bushido discourse after the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese war. This 
also demonstrate a characteristic of internal philosophical and moralist thinking that was 
on the rise on the Meiji post political fervor of the early 1880s, instead of being more 
adoptive of western thinking and measures. This invention of the Bushido tradition 
would not have only social and ideological connotations, as they would also have very 
heavy political denotations spurring from the fact of the idea of uniqueness in the 
Japanese people, which would eventually serve as justification for abuse against other 
ethnics such as the Chinese on World War Two.
The bushido idea that took place in the late Meiji that would grow and be cultivated 
until the end of World War Two – with a relative decline in the Taishô years – was an 
amalgamation of sorts that grew also increasingly by the success of the imperialistic 
undertakings of the Japanese military and its spurs of successful propaganda 
accompanying them. Of special note on later Meiji, two authors gained prominence: 
Nitobe Inazo and Inoue Tetsujirô. Nitobe had produced what was considered an 
anomaly within the sphere of debate, as he wrote his book while living in the United 
States, and being published initially in English. His book was heavily criticized in 
Japanese territory, but it was remarkably successful amongst foreigners, appearing on 
debates on the matter even to this day, in no small part due to simplistic associations 
from foreigners to his oversimplifications and not historically proven remarks such as 
affirming that all of Japanese spirit was encompassed by bushido, which seemed just 
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ludicrous to the Japanese. He was so heavily scrutinized amongst the spheres of debate 
that it took him a decade to publish the book in Japanese to the general audience (Oleg,  
90-97). It might be even more notable in the west as since the end of World War Two, 
the great interest of studying Japan also unfortunately meant that it was prone to a rather 
fruitless simplification of its ideological applications, fueled by cultural 
misunderstandings and ignorance of historical past. Inoue’s case was a bit more 
different. He was a man who harbored the idea that the Japanese were in an earlier 
evolutionary stage as the westerners at the same time that he had very anti-foreigners 
feelings, and argued for hasty urgency on measures to solve on this situation. His views 
gradually shifted to more rigid and stern ideas, but was also an advocate that there was 
something intrinsically unique to the Japanese – presenting some more concrete 
historical evidence than Nitobe – , and that the Japanese spirit as manifested in the idea 
of bushido was vital to success and survival of the nation, with this being the “source of 
the Japanese military’s great strength” (Oleg,  97-103). Inoue’s vision and influence to 
the notion of this national sense of Bushido – further fueled by his many years after 
working on the matter, which would go as almost 1944, was so strong that it consisted 
of most of what could be perceived as the Imperial Bushido. The years of the Russo-
Japanese war would be seen as the years of the Bushido Boom, fueled by a sense of 
nationalism and rivalry with what was perceived as one of the western powers, with a 
victory over Russia and official positive accounts. However, Inoue’s posture after was 
that of a bully who used of his personal ties and influence to ascertain his ideological 
claims and unfairly attacked fellow scholars who did not share with his views. He also 
tended to over think of the impact of his theory of bushido being a far reaching concept 
for every Japanese, as criticism by Yoshida Kenryû demonstrated about the lack of 
interest of rural population in adopting bushido as a moral guideline for behavior (Oleg,  
103-110).Even with a wide adoption of the term, that would come to penetrate great 
publicly – driven institutions or representations of culture, spanning from military and 
education and entering sports and religion, it also seemed like an intellectual fad that 
fell on character overtime and was just continued in the martial arts and military, 
organizations that were martial by nature (Oleg, 123-135). Nevertheless, using the term 
bushido, even if “Neo-bushido” or “National bushido” to apply as the sole guiding 
morality of the Japanese, even restraining to the institution that would have used it the 
most in the case of the military seems counterproductive argument-wise. To prove a 
perceived ‘national spirit’ permeating the whole nation throughout such a wide 
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historical period that Inoue or Nitobe claimed would be almost impossible in any sort of 
conceivable way besides conjunctures and wishful thinking. Even then, to try applying 
this as explanations of victory in something so tangible such as war, without 
considering logistics, planning and strategy seems borderline fanaticism. There is also 
the underlying problem that bushido is too primarily associated with the social class of 
the samurai, existing in too much pluralities and contexts to be considered as something 
that unique and unshakable. Surely, by process of indoctrination and distillation of 
values unto the commoners,  its efficiency might as well as be attested in increasing 
influence until World War Two, where soldiers were very compliant to suicide instead 
of surrender and other Bushido based attitudes, but Bushido as an unified national 
character seems severely limited in its applicability. The very nature of a martial code of 
ethics so intrinsically associated with the military and matters retaining to life and death 
would make most of its applicability very impractical at best when dealing with non-
soldiers, and exaggerated fantasy at worst.
Battle of the Yalu River, on the Russo-Japanese War
Source: https://commons.m.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Russo-
Japanese_War_1904_Yalu_River.j
Military’s Place on Society: Penetration and Acceptance
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 “The traits of particular nations will not necessarily disappear in the grand sweep of 
social evolution, but will become elements of a peaceful order of humanity. ’The 
nationals will merges with the human ideal’; each state will have as its aim ‘not to 
expand, or to lengthen its borders, but to set its own house in order and to make the 
widest appeal to its members or a moral life on an ever higher level’. By this means ‘all 
discrepancy between national and human morals would be excluded’54. Durkheim was 
accounting that a great period of wars were over, but his accounts of how the national 
and human morals being tied together fill exceedingly well with the applicability of the 
diffusion of the military institution in the Japanese context. There seemed to have no 
difference in the context of application of morality and its unity with nation, even more 
considering the case of the tentative of diffusion of the idea of the National Bushido 
through the very notion of the kokutai. Power is at its most intense and durable when 
running silently through the repetition of institutionalized practices55. Such a notion 
being a strong instrument of ideological domination and diffusion, ‘domination’ might 
not be a concept carrying an intrinsically negative connotation, according to Anthony 
Giddens.
The discontinuity of the power of the army during the period of the Taisho democracy 
would signify a substantial break from the extreme rise to the Japanese fascism that 
would occur years later, making the movement not so continuous at a quick glance, but 
the military institution never came to a halt in its activities when more deeply analyzed. 
As it stands, the army itself was basically a very well articulated bureaucracy, greatly 
serving the central government and having a non-stop obligation. One thing that 
certainly helped in the notion of the Military institution in relation to others is that it 
was always working actively, having to quell many small scale rebellions, the samurai 
rebellions of the 1870s (mainly Satsuma) and peasant revolts, and they were always 
victorious. Visible efficiency is a great tool of co-opting the mentality of the people, as 
well as making the institution seem more present. Overall reform and expeditions 
(counting Taiwan) meant that the military corps never truly saw a rest ever since their 
new implementation and their immediate action would not contribute to a social vision 
that the military was just idle and inactive, as it came to happen with the bushi on the 
dawn of the Bakumatsu. Even at the height of the Taishô Democracy, where the notion 
54 Émile Durkheim, Professional Ethics & Civic Morals, 1957  53
55 Giddens, Anthony, The Nation-State and Violence, Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of 
HIstorical Materialism,1985, Camgridge, Polity Press
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of social militarism came to a relative slowing, there was constant activity of the 
military in work in the newly acquired colonies and in expeditionary forces sent in 
WWI and in the Russian Revolution. As shown by Edward J. Drea’s Japan’s Imperial 
Army: Its Rise and Fall, constant reforms and reorganizations in the internal structure of 
the army and how it reworked its bureaucracy and a greater application on focusing on 
the newly found meritocratic approach in the army also in theory guaranteed that new 
and aspiring officers could in fact pursue ambitious careers as long as they performed 
well, something that could greatly influence the popular appeal of the military to a 
young and ambitious audience.  
Shared view amongst the communities that someone who went well in the military 
career would receive extreme social prestige and be a reason of pride for the ones who 
went up to become a superior private class56 The effort of relating the military ties and 
the rural communities was a master plan of sorts stemming from Tanaka, Ugaki and 
Yamagata Aritomo their mentor. They wanted to build a rich and militarily powerful 
Japan in an effort to mix the distinctions of both and to produce “civilian soldiers” as an 
unity of block to vanguard against the rise of subversive – to a conservative standpoint – 
ideals57 The Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese war produced a huge number of 
veterans. These veterans would serve an important role in the village life and the 
prospects of military and moralistic indoctrination and were actively incentivized and 
looked after by the military leaders, in special Yamagata and the leadership of General 
Tanaka Giichi who would establish the imperial military reserve association in 1910. 
This association would be very important in the prospects of the rural life.  Young men 
who had passed the physical examination but still were not called to active duty were 
also eligible to joining. Very high taxes of joining – 1920s and 1930s would see from 
45-50%, with close to 100% in rural areas. The veteran associations also consisted of 
the young men associations, made specifically to tailor to young men and to shield them 
from liberalists ideals such as communism, liberalism or anarchism made by General 
Tanaka by 1930, 2.7 million young men would foster in this association, with a 
remarkably high attendance amongst rural community, as to be expected, with nearly 
56 Yuuki Aisoka, Sonri Seikatsuki, Record of village life, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1935) p. 27
57 Richard J. Smethurst, “The Creation of the Imperial Military Reserve Association in Japan”, Journal of 
Asian Studies, xxx no. 4 (1971), pp. 815-828
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100 percent of eligible enrolled in the Kagoshima prefecture, whereas in Tokyo just 
17.2 percent58. 
The strategy was not so much to create a central figure and go from top to bottom; it 
was more an effort of acknowledging the social structures and life methods in the 
villages and towns so that just the sheer social pressure and the propagation of local 
customary life would give a great boost to the attendance and acceptance factor of the 
entity, which worked remarkably well in rural communities as proven by the numbers.
As such, the prospect of making life better, maybe a call to some sort of spirit of 
adventure, tiredness of an idle life as a simple peasant with extensive farm work and 
extreme social pressure were great incentives for one to pursue military career of some 
sort, spanning this whole mechanism almost exactly as some leaders such as Yamagata 
Aritomo have refrained. (Hane, 1982,  59-62).
It is also important to note on the role of the police force on the matter. The concept of 
police, in the modern sense would be quite new to a 19th century Japan. Given how 
historically moralistic military forces tend to be, and how conservatism was a rampant 
in the Meiji Period, having very moralistic-centric leaders, it is not hard to see why a 
police force would be very engaged on political repression at the time. The police would 
also end up being controlled by Yamagata Aritomo, and under his jurisdiction as 
minister of Home Affairs in December of 1883, the institution would go through a 
reformation in 1874. As we’ve seen repeatedly before, he was a strong advocate on the 
notion that political unrest was a detriment to the well being of the nation, and 
insubordination by soldiers was absolutely unacceptable and dangerous (Hackett, 102). 
Before 1874, the control of police enforcement was handed by shizoku from Satsuma 
and Chôshû until 1874 when the police of Tokyo was organized under a separate 
metropolitan police board, and the national police was in action by 1885 with local 
police being still at the main control of local authorities instead of a more unified chain 
of command. The government approach a German model used to train new police 
officers (Hackett,  103). “We must constantly encourage the education, discipline, and 
training of policemen” Yamagata would say, demonstrating his strong preoccupations 
on matters of internal and daily security, aside from his great aspirations in the military 
58 Richard J. Smethurst, A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1974) pp. xiv- xv 
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and external politics (Yamagata den, II, 995). The implementation of the system of a 
police box was far reaching and very useful for a government that was paranoid about 
political unrest and guaranteeing political and ideological peace (Hackett,  104). 
Attempts of making the police control public gatherings and deeming illegal any public 
activity not beforehand stated to the police with the names of the leaders and on what 
purpose (104). Peace preservation ordinance drafted at the end of 1887: (1) forbade all 
secret societies and assemblies (2) conferred on the police authority to halt any meeting 
or assembly and (3) gave the home minister authority to expel, within a fixed number of 
days or hours, any person residing or sojourning within a seven and one-half mile radius 
of the imperial palace who was judged to be inciting disturbances or disrupting public 
tranquility (Hackett, 105). The serious and drastic operation mentioned beforehand in 
this paper of 1887 was a decisive action in Yamagata’s intents. Aside from that, making 
the police visible and always present on a day-to-day basis could also have sprung deep 
into the minds of the citizens, whether on the capital or the rural areas, in a moralistic 
enforcement. Power was given on the individual police officer as to determine if a 
subject was subversive or not, and to police the peace – also meaning quelling any sort 
of undesired behavior. This was another instrument on influencing men of both the 
power of the nation, as to its enforcement of laws and social values. If particular 
policemen could be seen as good example, then it was an attractive idea to join either 
the military or some police force.
Like this, the bureaucratic apparatus, armed with a strong ideological front that was 
successful on repurposing traditions to its applications was what ultimately linked the 
civilian society with the military sphere, and future successes and expansions of the 
military apparatus would in turn have a dialectic relationship with how the society 
would absorb and interpret martial values, setting strong institutional grounds such as 
the Soldier’s Associations, helping to propagate itself by the end of the Meiji Era. 
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Chapter 5: The Meiji Emperor, Cornerstone of the Emperor
Who is the emperor? What is the emperor
To this day, Emperor Meiji seems to be one of the most famous amongst Japanese 
history. Most of what is related to the Emperor of Japan until the end of World War 
Two seems to be wrapped and untied in near fantasy and near fanaticism that accounts 
of the imperial persona came to be associated with. It is basically impossible to separate 
the figure of the man from the office. Emperor Mutsuhito, who was more institution 
than man, had a relatively simple rise to power, if one accounts only his life without 
acknowledging the complicated past of the Japanese monarchs. Not taking up any direct 
action in pretty much any stance of his life, he was still put as the man in charge from 
the young age of 18 when he officially ascended to the throne. The years of his rule 
would see the one of the most dramatic and successful cases of modernization – in an 
imperialistic westernized sense of the term – in the whole world, bolstering Japanese’s 
claims of first modernized nation in Asia. 
The philosopher Yoshimoto Ryûmei said on his book, Study of a Common Fantasy” 
that the idea that “the emperor symbolizes the unity of the Japanese nation, people and 
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culture is a common fantasy ( 322-328), however this vision is very hard to be 
challenged given the evidence and historical influence that the imperial institution has 
caused. Even if one separate the entity of the emperor to the so called spirit of unity 
amongst the Japanese, it is almost impossible to dissociate the idea that if the Emperor 
was not the root of it, it was definitely a symptom that came to support or symbolize it. 
The political organization of early Meiji who decided on the greater political matters on 
the national level was at a very good advantage point to establish the changes it wanted 
on a rural country with little to no institutions that were massive in scale and 
bureaucratic efficiency as they would be some 30 years later. Even if there was no 
agreement amongst the holders of power for the ascension of the imperial figure – 
which was basically used as a token of legitimacy for them to start the revolutionary 
raid in the first place after the realization of an old system meeting its end – who had 
any sufficient military power enough to oppose to the two most powerful domains at the 
time of the restoration? There was little choice besides ‘returning’ the lands to the 
central government in a measure of true unification. Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi 
Hideyoshi and Ieyasu Tokugawa are often called the “three great unifiers” of Japan, but 
the closest one to attain true unity would be the Meiji Emperor – or his agents on behalf 
of his name. A great fuel to a great establishment of institutions to be kept for long time 
or long regard is success, something the Meiji government had in its attempts.  It is also 
important to note that the personal life of Emperor Meiji – who would have been known 
by that title only after his death – matched extremely well in a historical frame within 
that of the modernization, making a very interesting story to be told and heard. It began 
by returning the nation to a righteous governor, who headed the nation on a great 
journey through modernization, civilization and the glorious beginning of an empire 
that had previously had immense successes in wars against rivals of old with different 
perceptions each, making the years from 1868 until 1912, the date of the death of the 
Emperor. This makes for a great storytelling, even after removing the romanticism of 
the elements. And simplicity and romanticism are often well understood and accepted 
for the common people, pouring even into academic work as we’ve seen in some 
previous cases of ideologists on this period. 
It is also true that, for better or worse, Emperor Mutsuhito was one exceptionally lucky 
man by historical standards. Pretty much all of the ventures made in his name were 
either successful, or its shortcomings were severely overshadowed. This was not a mere 
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coincidence as it was also a clear ideological project of separating the Emperor from 
failures and imbuing him with successes as to not compromise the strength of the 
imperial institution (Gluck, 1985,  90). 
Seeing the It is very convenient to link the emperor to the national spirit of Japan. The 
emperor as an entity ties to many historical factors that rose to the acceptance: its 
installation can be dated to religious roots. A traditional figure in Japanese history 
greatly tied to traditional Japanese religion in an era where the national identity and 
accounts for nationalism were shaping up quite strongly, tying to systems of early 
imperialistic boom and challenge to foreign powers.
In Donald Keene’s book, Emperor of Japan: Meiji and his World (2002, Columbia 
University Press)59, there are lengthy details about the person of Emperor Meiji – who 
was called as such only posthumously – and describing the problem with dealing with 
him as a person. A lot of what we know about the person comes from dubious accounts 
written by other people, and even the ones with a little less impressionable source such 
as foreign diplomats in contact with the emperor reveal very little of interest. Given how 
he was treated in later years of his reign until the end of World War Two, the very 
dealing of the concept of the Emperor is a complicated one, as it is usually clad in 
problems such as him being treated as an incarnate deity (arahitogami60) and being the 
ruler in charge in a great moment of nationalistic boom and national spirit that the figure 
is almost naturally overinflated such is the case with other legendary leaders of great 
fame throughout history. He would be greatly associated with three endeavors 
throughout his life: unification of Japan and reaching of political enlightenment, which 
was symbolized by him passing down the constitution to the people; his ventures as a 
military leader – even though he never set foot on a battlefield and had no tactical 
expertise whatsoever, having camped near his troops before the departure in the Sino-
Japanese war and commanding from the capital in the Russo-Japanese war; and his 
great association with Education, which seemed to be the one which his persona was 
most personally invested (Gluck, 1985,  83-88). I will break into these three aspects in a 
little more of detail ahead, but nevertheless, it is safe to say that significant amount of 
what was perceived of him in his image of excellence was for the most part attributed to 
his perceived divinity originated from his genealogy tracing back to the Sun Goddess. 
59 This work might be the Best documented biography of Emperor Meiji available in the English language
60 Such concept would appear initially on the Nihon Shôki, being spoken by the figure of Yamato Takeru
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The few of what we have from the man himself seems to be his poems, which he was 
decently skilled at. Many of these poems would read about the vast beauty and scale of 
his country, and others would deal about his melancholy about the wars that Japan 
entered while under his government. (Keene,2002,  10). One almost undisputed fact 
about the emperor is that he was particularly worried about the prospect of entering in 
wars, maybe out of fear from defeat or failure to his ancestors.
Ironically, his role in political terms seem to be rather matured only in the brief years 
after the greater establishment of the Japanese empire following the victory over china 
at the end of the 19th century, and where it comes to direct geopolitical diplomacy 
regarding accounts due to a newfound imperial expansion.
However, as Mutsuhito’s loyalists forces were successful in guaranteeing the defense of 
the imperial symbol to their legitimacy, would never more see a challenge in the 
political realm within the years until his death in 1912, despite numerous rebellions and 
revolts. The great Satsuma Rebellion of 1876 never wanted to dethrone the emperor, but 
rather cleanse the imperial figure from the influence of men who seemed rather 
incapable or harmful, in hopes to supplant them (Drea, 2009). His majesty’s symbolic 
and political voice – or at least his signature and perceived writing –  would constantly 
be used as a symbolic figure to unify and guarantee a spirit of union to a recently 
revolutionized nation, reborn in face of great challenges from the outside, as well as 
political secular power granting legitimacy and urgency to his words, mainly in the 
pivotal years of the 1880s and the maturing of Japanese institutions, who desperately 
needed success after failed experimentations and social challenges such as rebellions, 
politically articulated demands and poverty. However, most of the documents in which 
the emperor himself is attributed to, such as the Charter Oath of 1868 and the Imperial 
Rescript of Education, and mainly the Constitution of 1889 would only receive his 
signature, being crafted by other persons. Politically, however, this small difference 
doesn’t seem to have made meant much in their perception, as words backed by the 
emperor could be very well interpreted by him.  
Imperial Tours, Recognition and the Tradition of Shinto 
Mori Kokichi, in an Article published in the Japanese journal of religious studies (6,4) 
December 1979,  522-565) attributes the success of the formation and establishment 
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around the Meiji state  to mainly three factors that seem to be agreed on a general 
consensus amongst scholars: (1) the homogeneity of the structure of community having 
common acceptance of ethical values of loyalty and filial piety, (2) the educational 
system comprised of the schools, army and religious institutions tied by ideological 
control used by the police and (3) the power of the emperor as a religious symbol that 
mixed indigenous popular beliefs and officially sponsored institutional Shinto. 
Considering what we know of Japanese society in those years, it feels safe as to separate 
them in two distinct spheres of the common people, mainly those living in rural areas 
than those of scholars and politicians. To the general population, it feels more important 
the establishment and persevering of traits (1) and (3). To him, the imperial figure is 
constructed essentially by a religious approach infused within the society. 
Embed with the power of hindsight, we know that the Meiji leaders happened to be very 
skilled – or learned to be – in what seems to be identifying the structures of Japan of 
that time and applying an efficient intricate bureaucracy that could reach even the 
remotest village. However, to the general Japanese population, who seemed to know the 
figure of the emperor only by tradition and by fantastic history – basically what allowed 
the figure to still be alive in the popular mind – it was important to show that that man 
was actually a real person, despite being an incarnate god or not. To this, the concepts 
of an arahitogami and kokutai were an important one. Attaining to old tradition based in 
popular myths and imaginary, these type of figures were said to be incarnate gods on 
earth, with the notion appearing in Shinto texts of old such as the Nihon Shiki, with the 
emperor being of a special case, descending from the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, the most 
important deity of the Japanese Shinto Pantheon, and ruling the country, being 
recognized by both amatsukami (the heavenly gods) and kunitsukami (the earthly gods). 
The emperor also was strongly associated with rice and its cultural importance for 
Japan. There was also an intrinsic linking of the idea of goryô shinkô (angry spirits of 
important people, usually emperors or high-profile politicians) who permeated the 
folklore of the land, and bad omens happened from these angry spirits who needed to be 
deified in order to calm their rage, and such a popular thinking survived throughout the 
centuries through religious and oral tradition (Kokichi, 1979,  532-533). One of the 
greater examples of these kinds of perceived spirits is the one of Taira-no-Masakado, 
who to this day has a modern sanctuary at the heart of Tokyo. 
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Despite Shinto being somewhat eclipsed with the great spreading of Buddhism in Japan 
during hundreds of years, some of that symbolism never truly died or vanished. As 
such, the emperor could transform from being a symbolic figure to a political one, 
mixing both accounts, with the aforementioned concurrent ideas of both the kokutai – 
an immutable spirit – and the seitai – the mutable one, accounting for earthly politics.
To both prove that the emperor was in fact a person, and to incentivize the overall 
learning of his image and to establish a bigger contact with the population, the emperor 
was taken on the undertaking of imperial tours, which seemed to have great historical 
and symbolical importance. In the years from 1868 to his death in 1912, Emperor Meiji 
did 102 tours, most of them taking place before the installment of the cabinet system in 
1885. Accounts say that the reception to the tours were not unanimously positive, with 
some people acting with some bit of indifference or not understanding what the 
Emperor is supposed to represent61. A painting that would be made in 1888 coined by 
which he is the most known even to this day in 1888, which would be given later, along 
a copy of the imperial Rescript on Education, to every school, academy, barracks or 
university along the national territory. Considering logistics, this method was way more 
successful at a lower cost (Haga, 1974,  101 – 107). It is also important to note that the 
Emperor’s personal presence at places became way rarer after the constitution was 
promulgated, and it is said that even roads were cleared before his passage to help 
alleviate traffic (Gluck, 1985,  79), whereas in the 1870s this would be unthinkable. 
This may be very well a symptom of the perceived maturity of the state, which was 
already sufficiently matured to have the confidence surrounding an already diffused and 
uncontested the imperial figure. However, it feels that, in an institutional and personal 
way, the emperor was basically held captive. Pretty much all concerning details about 
his public persona, appearances and places of visit seemed to be in some sort of way or 
other being controlled or wrestled by inner household politics, mainly those related  to 
the Imperial Household Ministry, with some occasional personal ties such as Ito and 
Aritomo also being very influential (Gluck, 1985,  80). However, the limits of how 
much the control that the emperor seemed to be under are very unclear, as there is not 
much detail on his personal thinking, and it seems as his way of governance was a bit 
more passive on regards to receiving advices from his ministers, not being too engaged 
61 Noboru, Haga, Meiji Kokka to minshû [The Meiji Nation and the Common People], 1974, Tokyo, Yûzan 
Kaku, 
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on his own62 .  The members of the oligarchy could also convince the emperor in many 
aspects in the taking of important decisions, such as the expulsion of Okuma Shigenobu 
from their ranks. Occasionally, members of the imperial family also did draw authority 
from their statuses in relation to the emperor. In the Japanese monarchic case, the ruler 
was not tied to a court, and despite members of the imperial family being able to 
perpetrate power, the ruler was more surrounded by what could be perceived as civilian 
politicians or military politicians with no aristocratic background, with in fact a great 
part of the titular “aristocracy” being artificially created just as measures to bolster the 
seats of the house of peers. Of special note is Prince Arisugawa, who had been the main 
commander of the imperial forces in the Boshin War, and who also took important 
command in the campaigns in Satsuma, and was also one of the main talkers in the 
proposals of the Meiji Constitution. The traditional state on its forms of bureaucracy, 
class, ideology perpetrates that 'political power is regarded as the personal disposition of 
the ruler, and anyone who participates in that power does so as a personal right rather 
than as the incumbent of an office’, and in the Japanese case this was greatly 
represented by the politicians from which the (Giddens, 1987,  61). Western monarchies 
are historically clad in a way where the monarchs tend to be in an able body of political 
game with other members of an aristocracy, even in the case of absolutism, with maybe 
a notable exception in Louis XIV as he tried to distance himself from boundaries in 
terms of authority. The Meiji monarch didn’t need that, it seems, despite not having 
been enthroned to power by himself or forces commanded directly by him, but maybe 
the idea that power was bestowed upon him with him being a source of legitimacy 
mutually understood amongst the elites already at the time before the restoration made it 
a case of mutual understanding of oligarchic parts that their power was emanated 
through association and servitude of the emperor and his institutions, while they were as 
mere expansion of imperial power, so there was no challenge to his figure.  
With the copies of the imperial images of the Emperor and Empress, copies of the 
Rescript on Education were enshrined and people were set on the sole function of 
protecting it even at their own life (Susumu and Murphy , 2009,  103).
Essentially the initial belief in the emperor recalls for a cultural and religious aspect, 
again trying to reutilize a figure throughout a Hobsbawnian definition of tradition. Even 
62 Meiji tennô heika no kôtei,” Sekai no Nihon (Cct 1896), 3
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though his persona was seen as divine, the Emperor would still represent a wide array of 
meanings. 
 
The Meiji Emperor by Edoardo Chiossone
The most important in my opinion, is the instance of the imperial figure being 
recognized as that of a military commander, such is the case described by Anthony 
Giddens on account of monarchs (Giddens, 1987  77). Saigo Takamori was one of the 
great advocates of using the imperial figure to instigate loyalty to the troops and be seen 
as commander. In fact, this was greatly coined in the rescripts redirected to the military, 
and with all the zeal to the imperial figure that the military would learn to cultivate in 
the years of Meiji. The very image coined by Edoardo Chiossone (the one above) gave a 
special focus to the emperor’s military adornments, mimicking those of monarchs of the 
west. It was important to convey the image of power to the emperor. His venture into 
camping before the campaign in China was a very powerful instrument and inculcating 
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for the first time in history to the common populace63, on which accounts say that the 
Emperor spent the camp time in Hiroshima on stark living conditions, with little more 
than desks or chairs to sleep and no separate bedroom (Drea, 2009,  80).
Another imperial persona that was important for the institutional linking of the Emperor 
was that associated with education. This one seemed like it was one on which he was 
personally engaged, as said before. Linking education to military ethos and values, 
which were also linked to the simplistic thinking of the imperial family as the ‘head 
family’ of Japan and the idea of chûkun aikoku, a term called by Mori Arinori64 on the 
hopes of creating loyal subjects was one of the most important undertakings in relation 
to social relations.  
Even after his relative retirement from most of public view on the years after the 
Constitution was proclaimed, the emperor still participated greatly on the annual 
ceremonies of the Imperial University of Tokyo in July of each year, making the 
happening something extremely prestigious (Gluck, 1985,  83-88). 
Also, it was established a system of  holidays and ceremonies on schools celebrating the 
emperor’s important character, such as a holiday for the fabled foundation of Japan by 
emperor Jimmu  on February  11 (kigensetsu) and the birthday of Mutsuhito himself, 
making it the most important of the imperial holidays (tenchôetsu, November 3rd). This 
was not completely well-implemented as planned, as miscommunication in rural areas 
tended to interpret the dates a bit wrong, but the overall character of celebrating the 
empire and the emperor seemed to have been a successful venue (Gluck,  85-88).
The emperor was a strong figure in the sense of chûkun aikoku, loyalty and patriotism 
Post-Constitution, the Emperor-State System
The emperor system ideology would have its “official” beginning at around the 1890s, 
22 years after the restoration. Maybe because of the inauguration of the Diet and the 
greater political conscience that a constitution has bought, it was easy to link this to a 
specific date, since before the government seemed a bit more informal and non-
institutionalized, even though there was a somewhat clear hierarchy that there was the 
63 Fujiwara, Gunjishi, 103-104; Ôe, Nichi-Ro gunjishiteki kenkyû, 9
64 “Kakugian” (between 1887-1889, date unclear): Mori Arinori zenshû 1:345. “Intangible” (mukei): 
Kaimon Sanjin, Mori Arinori (Min’yûsha, 1897), 81-82
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Emperor on top, followed by the Genrô and then the factual heads of institutions. The 
constitution seemed to merely confirm what everyone knew, and no one would be crazy 
enough to doubt that the Emperor was the de facto ruler of Japan in all institutional 
ways possible. Articles 1 and 3 of the constitution said, respectively:
Article 1: The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of 
emperors unbroken for ages eternal.
Article 3: The emperor is sacred and inviolable.65
Ito was very clear on his goals on granting the Emperor and the imperial institution with 
the greatest powers imaginable, however with the developments of the diet, Aritomo 
and others would also be preoccupied with the overuse of the emperor in a political 
sense, which could undermine his symbolic role and politicize the institution. This way, 
the constitutional system could be considered a mere continuation of the government as 
it was being before in what was related to the emperor: the emperor had the final saying 
and absolute power if it was necessary, but he himself was not the one carrying the 
government nor worrying about ordinary ruling questions. His right of closing the diet 
almost came to fruition in the small crisis of 1892, where his remarks seemed genuinely 
annoyed by having to involve with the messy politics. The constitution also brought 
new problems in the sense that there was no clear limit as to until where the powers 
befalling the Prime Minister would start conflicting with those of the emperor himself. 
Ito himself seemed to know well about this, and according to his own words one 
shouldn’t worry too much about that because of the natural conflicting nature of a 
constitutional parliament and an emperor. Luckily, the naturally conservative nature of 
Japanese higher echelon politics allowed the imperial institution to never conflict much 
with that of the parliament for a wrestle in power.  
However, for much of the emperor’s perceived legalized power, he himself governed 
very little. Most of the tasks of governing were imbued to his ministers, with him being 
a somewhat disassociated figure with the matter, and only being called in extreme cases 
into direct participation. 
Regarding the duality of the Emperor attaining both some religious power or symbolism 
and the political ones, Inoue Kowashi was categorical in 1890 arguing about Shinto that 
65 Taken from The National Diet’s Library website, located in www.ndl.go.jp
91
“rites are an affair of society, not an affair of state” (Gluck, 1985,  77). This could 
represent a clearer ideological separation of material and secular politics and ritualism 
and spirituality (even when considering Shinto as a national religion) that, despite both 
converging in the same person, didn’t mean they would fuse. Even though the religious 
concept used before in order to use the imperial figure on its quest of self-affirmation 
and ideological settlement, the emperor couldn’t simply take on such religious roles. At 
least this seems to be a worry with higher figures. The idea of duality of the imperial 
role in a ritualistic sense and political are in accordance to Gramsci’s ideas of 
permeability not by force, but in the smart use of institutions constituting a small 
ideological common universe on which the common thinking befalls almost naturally66
.Such notions and debates happened at the time of the traditionalist and conservationist 
swing of the pendulum that traditional philosophies and religions such as Buddhist, 
Confucianism and Shintoism would be in a rise after a relative failure of western ways 
of thinking.  
However, the durability of the imperial institution in Japanese history is truly 
remarkable, considering that for around seven centuries the figure had little to no 
political power into Japanese affairs, but still seemed to be greatly respected still in 
Tokugawa period pre-Boshin war. Impressive, considering that the imperial figure spent 
all this time being politically sheltered and captivated. One thing that might have 
contributed to this fact is the change of capitals after the establishment of Edo, in which 
the court was left to its own while the de facto politically powerful figure of the shogun 
resided elsewhere. But its popularity amongst the rural people was dubious at best, even 
more when considering by some accounts that many peasants even doubted that such a 
figure had existed, with Itô Hirobumi himself confessing to his foster-father that he only 
knew of the existence of the Emperor until he studied with Yoshida Shôin (Hayashi 
1973, p. 92, 158)  In this way, a great deal of focus amongst the Meiji leaders was the 
simple act of propaganda effort into the very notion of the existence of the emperor, and 
that person being divine in nature. Pretty much more than a millennia of Buddhist 
dissolution into the own essence of Shinto and it’s no wonder that even the notion of 
divinity emanating from the emperor could be considered jeopardized. It may be argued 
that this was one of the very reasons that resorting in getting a religious validation was a 
66 Gramsci, Antonio, Selections From the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quitin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell smith, 1971, New York, International,  12-13, 80, and passim. Also, Althusser, “Ideology and 
Ideological State Apparatuses,” Lenin and Philosophy and other essays
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big issue for the authority of the emperor. However, one thing to note is that this 
coming from the high statesmen of Meiji this was somewhat curious, as amongst them 
some were Christians. Mori Arinori, the man who would be the first minister of 
education and in charge of reorganizing the school system, ended up being assassinated 
for this matter and disrespecting Shinto traditions by a fanatic on the very day of the 
proclamation of the constitution. 
For all effects, emperor is not a person, but an institution. However, the duality of this is 
an odd case, for one of the reasons after the Emperor Meiji’s death that the Taisho crisis 
would eventually happen, but it is debatable if that would be for the solidity of the 
already matured relations between the Emperor and his surrounding politicians and 
advisers, or the exhaustion of the system were the Genrô were the actual decision 
callers, or if it was solely a negative overreaction of attempt of military authoritarianism 
controlling politics that got in crisis once the transitory period between the emperors 
happened. 
The emperor of the Empire: Late Meiji Politics
It seems a rather briefed upon subject, but it is important to analyze the grammatical 
root of the Term “Emperor”. Dating back from the Roman history, the role of Emperor 
is naturally put upon a recognized figure of an empire, with empire generally meaning 
also land conquered through diplomacy or warfare, much of which would not have 
come to fruition in japanese context until the victory of the sino-Japanese war in 1895. 
It seems rather interesting, however, on how the term “emperor” seems to be used more 
by a lack of a better translation, but why not use “king”? In diplomat’s letters retaining 
from the pre-restoration years, foreign officials have used the term “king” to refer to 
both the Emperor and to the Shogun, an use which seems rather right for the common 
conception of the term in western understanding. But the idea that Emperor equals the 
Japanese term of Tennô (heavenly king) spurs much curiosity when thinking in deep for 
the term. There seems to have a general consensus on which confers that the title of 
“Emperor” is way bigger than “King”. A very contemporary example in the Meiji 
period can be seen for Korea, who, after being put back under Japanese influence post 
Sino-Japanese war, claimed its king as emperor in a vain attempt of establishing more 
power to the monarchic figure, but was rather ill lived because of the general chaos and 
lack of central authority that the kingdom had. 
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Undoubtedly the translation used in official texts or other documents by officials and 
scholars to “Emperor” seemed to be a case to instigate more of a patriotic feel of pride 
towards the monarch, something which was really important in an era of expanding 
imperialism and defense from it. Certainly having an emperor seemed better than 
having a king, and the term of “Heavenly Emperor” seems a bit too tacky when 
translated.  So, despite of the account of semantics, the emperor of Japan truly became 
an emperor almost to the end of his life, when it comes to actual political participation.
The victory obtained over China, Russia and the very successful treaty with England 
would guarantee a great future to Japan in geopolitics. Of immediate, this meant not 
only that they would not need to fight against the British, as they were now free of the 
worries of a multiple international intervention in case they waged war against one of 
the western powers. The greater approach with Korea – which would eventually become 
a colony of Japan – and the acquisition of Taiwan were a great start for an imperial 
aspiration. Successful instances of imperialism are the perfect fuel for igniting national 
pride, which also boots the strength and formation of national authority. 
Conclusion 
 Being subject to an extremely lengthy ideological tug of war, with his name being 
thrown around in the most varied spheres of society, and incorporating a multitude of 
functions, most of them with mere symbolic meaning most of the time, Emperor 
Mutsuhito would die in peace on July 30th of 1912. During his reign, Japan would go 
from extremely jeopardized within the geopolitical context to a fully modernized power, 
which could stand up to adversities. The sheer wide array of reforms – which despite 
successful, still did not quite grant Japan the status of superpower – and their intensity 
was truly remarkable, spanning from all spheres within a society, from the practicality 
of economy and war, to very intense and varied debates on intangible matters such as 
national identity, morality, ethics, political rights and so on. Japan was also able to get 
rid of the limitations imposed by the treaties signed half a century before. Despite much 
of what was still understandable as rural Japan still having severe problems on living 
and infrastructure67, the genuine effort of reaching for this faraway parcel of the 
67 Mikiso Hane’s book, Peasants, Rebels, Women and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan is a 
great source for such accounts on Later Meiji and going all the way to Shôwa, of a ruralized abandoned 
Japan
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population was also remarkable. Even though the Emperor could not be a terribly 
interesting individual in life, the period carrying his name sure was, and he’ll probably 
be remembered for a long time as the Monarch of Enlightenment. 
Conclusion
The military concluded the Meiji Era being the most important and powerful of the 
Meiji institutions. A great project on inculcating the minds of subjects, starting from the 
basic education and borrowing from historical notions that were perverted or severely 
transformed them, based on sayings by chauvinist nationalists and an ever increasing 
military apparatus – almost exponentially so in such a short term of less than two 
decades, which was greatly boomed by two very significant successes in wars against 
very important adversaries – guaranteed a great penetration of martial values into the 
society, even though they could not be fully understood by one who was not a soldier. 
These ideas had a very conservative and nationalistic character which were greatly 
infused into the national identity, that on its turn also helped to self propagate the 
feeling in a dialectic process already explained by Berger and Luckman68. A smart 
understanding of the smaller organizations of Japanese countryside life made for an 
easier articulation of socially reaching institutions of great socially mobilizing power, 
even though their ever reaching hands could be questioned (Gluck,  11).
I have made the attempt of basing my approach on a weberian notion of military 
institution with its norms, regulations and propagation in culture and its bureaucracy, 
being neutral, formal and rational but the Japanese military was not at such an state of 
affairs, as it was heavily prone to personal cliques, favors and privileges instead of the 
weberian ideal. Yamagata Aritomo, who would have received the title of Prince in his 
life was the greatest culprit of this, installing a very powerful clique amongst the army, 
which would be called the “Chôshû clique” which would contrast with a more Satsuma-
oriented clique happening in the navy, despite both cliques having many officers that 
68 The dialectic of ideology in turn with the societies in which they are constructed and help to affect, in 
definition coined by Berger and Luckman’s   (Peter l. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The social 
construction of reality: a treatise in the sociology of knowledge (New York, anchor books, 1966), 123-28. 
A discussion of similar issues in more philosophical terms: Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds., 
Interpretive social science: a reader (Berkeley: university of California press, 1979)2-8, and passim. 
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originally came from the other domain. There is not even need to put the critique of this 
vision by Robert Merton on his saying that the ideal bureaucracy tended to be rigid and 
over time resistant to change, for the relations of the Meiji military would start changing 
coming the Taishô Period, where the public view of the military had suffered a heavy 
blow because of the maneuvers of the Taishô Crisis (Oleg, 2014,  157), with a newly 
made officer corps ready to substitute the corpses of the old commanders who have 
started to feel the age cracking on their bones. However, weberian approach to 
institutions is still very interesting to use on the case of the Japanese institutions, despite 
not being the ideal. 
It might be an easy comparative of drawing parallels of Japan and Germany in the 
context of late industrial modernization backed by the military. As I have mentioned in 
the paper on chapter 3, there were some attempts of it. And the parallels are very visible 
indeed: a belated unification being carried by a focus on militarism. A capitalistic 
expansion with almost immediate imperialistic intents, giving space for an immediate 
victory against an old rival in a war right after the first spur of modernization (France 
and China), and then expansionism, with the parallels ending on World War II with 
fascist empires strongly based on myths of racial superiority and fanaticism to a leader, 
where both systems would die together.
Despite the simple parallels being striking – and they are at first glance indeed – 
this is an oversimplification without considering the political and organizational 
realities that led to the implementation of these systems, at the same time that they 
would be different in their internal logics such as demonstrated by Eiko Ikegami (1995, 
34-36). 
It was the vanguard of military undertakings that have shaped much of the 
political and ideological discourse related to the Meiji undertakings. In the span of 
around two generations, people who were barred of even porting a sword now could not 
only ascend to a high official post within the hierarchy, occupying places that their 
grandparents could never think of, reshaping their lives, social interactions and the 
whole social structure of the village and towns. Conscription sites, army barracks, 
soldier associations, all becoming new social places opened within the Japanese society, 
where they could also conflict with people deriving from past samurai traditions and 
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being able to fight against that, igniting a subculture never before seen and social 
iterations. 
It was a great pressure on military terms of the foreign powers that brought the 
looming threat of international military action made the blood boil enough for the 
insurrection and potential Meiji revolution that came to be. Japan’s history on 
ascertaining as an estate can be confused with the history of modernization and the 
weird relation of defending from imperialism by becoming an imperialist nation itself, 
and on that it used the violence and political means of the military for its ends, greatly 
affecting the society it was based upon. 
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